Legal News & Views

In CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1263 OF 2019, Shiv Kumar Jatia vs State of NCT of Delhi,  criminal cases were filed alleging negligence on the part of hotel, against the company, its managing director and its officers who are incharge of day to day affairs of the hotel. The petition seeking to quash FIR against the managing director was turned down by the High Court. Examining the dictum laid down in earlier judgments including in Sunil Bharti Mittal vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, the bench observed that by applying the ratio laid down by this Court in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal, it is clear that an individual either as a Director or a Managing Director or Chairman of the company can be made an accused, along with the company, only if there is sufficient material to prove his active role coupled with the criminal intent. Further the criminal intent alleged must have direct nexus with the accused. Further in the case of Maksud Saiyed vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. , this...

In Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy vs. Baddam Pratapa Reddy (Dead), the disputed signature of the first defendant was identified by his brother as those of the first defendant himself. However, another defence witness, a handwriting expert, deposed that the admitted signatures of the first defendant and the disputed signature do not tally, and that it s forged. The trial court refused to rely on expert evidence and decreed the suit of specific performance filed by the plaintiff, while the High Court did rely on it, and dismissed the suit. In appeal filed by the plaintiff, the bench comprising Justice NV Ramana, Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Justice Ajay Rastogi observed that the Court must be cautious while evaluating expert evidence, which is a weak type of evidence and not substantive in nature. The weight to be accorded to such an opinion depends on the extent of familiarity shown by the witness with the disputed handwriting. This, in turn, depends on the frequency with which th...

In Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 664 of 2019,  IN THE MATTER OF NUI Pulp and Paper Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s. Roxcel Trading GMBH, an application under Section 9 of the Insolvency Code was filed by the respondent against which the Corporate Debtor had filed a caveat. The Corporate Debtor also claimed the existence of a dispute and the Adjudicating Authority allowed time to file affidavit by the Corporate Debtor and rejoinder by the respondent. However at that stage, the respondent having expressed apprehension of the Corporate Debtor intending to sell the assets of the ‘Corporate Debtor’ to defeat the purpose of the ‘I&B Code’ and cause wrongful losses to all the creditors including the ‘Operational Creditor’, passed an interim order under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016, restraining the Corporate Debtor and its Directors from alienating, encumbering or creating any third party interest on the assets of the 1st Respondent Company till further orders. Agains...

In CIVIL APPEAL NO.20978 of 2017,  JK JUTE MILL MAZDOOR MORCHA vs JUGGILAL KAMLAPAT JUTE MILLS COMPANY LTD., the appeal was filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the order of the NCLAT wherein the Ld. NCLAT had agreeing with NCLT had rejected the application of the appellant to be considered as an Operational Creditor under the Insolvency Code. The objection to the claim was that as no services are rendered by a trade union to the corporate debtor to claim any dues which can be termed as debts, trade unions will not come within the definition of operational creditors. That apart, each claim of each workman is a separate cause of action in law, and therefore, a separate claim for which there are separate dates of default of each debt. This being so, a collective application under the rubric of a registered trade union would not be maintainable. Referring to the definition of an Operational Creditor and debt under Section 3(23) & Section 5(c) of the Insolve...

The Article 65 of Limitation Act, 1963 not only enables a person to set up a plea of adverse possession as a shield as a defendant but also allows a plaintiff to use it as a sword to protect the possession of immovable property or to recover it in case of dispossession. In CIVIL APPEAL NO.7764 OF 2014, RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL vs MANJIT KAUR & ORS., the question before the 3 judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether Article 65 of the Limitation Act only enables a person to set up a plea of adverse possession as a shield as a defendant and such a plea cannot be used as a sword by a plaintiff to protect the possession of immovable property or to recover it in case of dispossession. Whether he  is remediless in such a case? Why a person who has perfected his title by way of adverse possession cannot file a suit for obtaining an injunction protecting possession and for recovery of possession in case his dispossession is by a third person or by an owner after the extingui...

In CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1020 OF 2010, Rangappa vs Sri Mohan, the presumptions mandated in Sections 118, 138 & 139 of the Negotiable Instrument Act were argued upon before the Supreme Court. It was contended on behalf of the appellant-accused that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does not extend to the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability and that the same stood rebutted in this case, keeping in mind the discrepancies in the complainant’s version. It was reasoned that it is open to the accused to rely on the materials produced by the complainant for disproving the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability.  The Supreme Court was in agreement with the respondent-claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative obj...

In OP(Crl.).No.348 OF 2019, T.K.SAJEEVAN vs FRANCIS T.CHACKO, the appeal was filed against the order of the lower court to deposit 25% of the fine before filling of appeal. The appellant argued that the deposit introduced through the Section 148 of the NI Act after amendment was directory in nature as it used the term 'may' while mentioning the issue of deposit. The Kerala High Court however disagreeing held that in view of the object of the Legislature while incorporating Section 148 into N.I. Act, the word 'may' will have to be read as 'shall'. The imposition of payment contemplated under Section 148 N.I. Act cannot be restricted to some prosecutions and evaded in other prosecutions. Since the amount directed to be deposited being compensation, undoubtedly, it is liable to be ordered to be deposited irrespective of the nature of the prosecution. Therefore, the word 'may' can only be taken to have the colour and meaning of 'shall' and there...