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Court rulings on Tax matters - Jan 2013

1) CIT vs. MAK Data Ltd (Delhi High Court)
January 29th, 2013

S. 271(1)(c): Surrender of income without explanation attracts penalty

A survey u/s 133A was conducted on the assessee’s premises in the course of which certain documents belonged to certain entities who had applied for shares in the assessee company were found. The AO called upon the assessee to prove the nature and source of the monies received as share capital, the creditworthiness of the applicants and the genuineness of the transactions. The assessee offered Rs. 40.74 lakhs as income from other sources “to avoid litigation and to buy peace“. It was made clear that in making the surrender, there was no admission of concealment. The AO completed the assessment by adding the said sum and levied penalty u/s 271(1)(c) for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income u/s 271(1)(c). This was upheld by the CIT(A) though reversed by the Tribunal (included in file) on the ground that there was no material to show any concealment and even in the penalty order it was not specified as to the particular credit in respect of which the penalty was being imposed. It was also emphasized by the Tribunal that the assessee had made it clear while surrendering that there was no admission of concealment and that the offer was made in a spirit of settlement. On appeal by the Department to the High Court, HELD reversing the Tribunal:

When the AO called upon the assessee to produce evidence as to the nature and source of the amount received as share capital, the creditworthiness of the applicants and the genuineness of the transactions the assessee simply folded up and surrendered the sum of Rs. 40.74 lakhs by merely stating that it wanted to “buy peace“. In the absence of any explanation in respect of the surrendered income, the first part of clause (A) of Explanation 1 to s. 271(1)(c) is attracted because the nature and source of the amount surrendered are facts material to the computation of total income. The absence of any explanation regarding the receipt of the money, which is in the exclusive knowledge of the assessee leads to an adverse inference against the assessee and is statutorily considered as amounting to concealment of income under the first part of clause (A) of the Explanation to s. 271(1)(c) and penalty has to be levied.


2) The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Chennai Vs. A.R. Enterprises
Income Tax – Advance Tax – Undisclosed Income

The issue was whether payment of Advance Tax by an assessee would by itself tantamount to disclosure of income for the relevant assessment year and whether such income can be treated as undisclosed income for the purpose of application of Chapter XIVB of the Act? Scope of Chapter XIV-B and its Provisions

The Hon'ble Supreme Court decided that if we were to hold that the payment of Advance Tax reflects the intention of the assessee to disclose its income, it could result in a situation where the mandatory obligation of filing a return for disclosure of income under the provisions of the Act, would not be necessary. It will be open to an assessee to contend that payment of Advance Tax is tantamount to disclosure of income. Such a proposition would be contrary to the very purpose of filing of return, which ultimately leads to assessment of total income for the relevant assessment year.


........Mere deduction of tax at source, also, does not amount to disclosure of income, nor does it indicate the intention to disclose income most definitely when the same is not disclosed in the returns filed for the concerned assessment year.

3) I.C.D.S. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore & Anr.
Income Tax – Depreciation

The question before the court was who is the owner of a vehicle and therefore who is entitled to claim depreciation for a vehicle paid for and leased out by a leasing company but is registered in the name of the lessee and also used by the lessee.

….. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, we hold that the lessor i.e. the assessee is the owner of the vehicles. As the owner, it used the assets in the course of its business, satisfying both requirements of Section 32 of the Act and hence, is entitled to claim depreciation in respect of additions made to the trucks, which were leased out. …. the appeals are allowed; the impugned judgments are set aside and the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court, extracted in para 6 (supra), are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Whether the Appellant (assessee) is the owner of the vehicles which are leased out by it to its
customers and Whether the Appellant (assessee) is entitled to the higher rate of depreciation on
the said vehicles, on the ground that they were hired out to the Appellant’s customers.

4) Bangalore Club Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr.
Income Tax – Exemption - Doctrine of mutuality

The question before the court was whether or not the interest earned by the assessee on the surplus funds invested in fixed deposits with the corporate member banks is exempt from levy of Income Tax, based on the doctrine of mutuality?

The court decided that "In our opinion, unlike the aforesaid surplus amount itself, which is exempt from tax under the doctrine of mutuality, the amount of interest earned by the assessee from the afore-noted four banks will not fall within the ambit of the mutuality principle and will therefore, be exigible to Income-Tax in the hands of the assessee-club."

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