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No Sec. 271(1)(c) penalty for not offering capital gains on Sec. 50C stamp duty value

CIT vs. Madan Theatres (Calcutta High Court)


The assessee sold property for a consideration of Rs. 2.50 crore. However, for the purpose of stamp duty, the property was valued at Rs. 5.19 crore and stamp duty was paid on that value. The assessee offered capital gains on the basis that the sale consideration was Rs. 2.50 crore. The AO invoked s. 50C and held that the sale consideration had to be taken at Rs. 5.19 crore and capital gains computed on that basis. The AO imposed penalty u/s 271(1)(c) which was deleted by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal by relying on Renu Hingorani. On appeal by the department to the High Court, HELD dismissing the appeal:


Though the assessee could have disputed the valuation on the basis of the deemed value and chose not to do so, the fact remains that the actual amount received was offered for taxation. It is only on the basis of the deemed consideration that the proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) started. The revenue has failed to produce any iota of evidence that the assessee actually received one paise more than the amount shown to have been received by him. As such, there is no scope to admit the appeal

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