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Company tardy in filing court reply loses right to be heard

Background: The aim of the Consumer Protection Act is to provide speedy justice within a time bound period. To achieve this objective, the Act prescribes a period of 30 days for filing a reply, with the leeway of one extension of 15 days. However, the casual approach of parties against whom a case is filed (opponents) can delay proceedings.

Earlier, the consumer fora were liberal in granting extension upon extension to permit opponents to file their reply to the complaint "in the interest of justice". As opponents started taking undue advantage of the liberal approach, consumers were harassed with unnecessary delay and needless adjournments. Realizing this, the fora have become strict in enforcing the time frame for filing of replies.

Case Study: Kanan Kintwear had filed a complaint against Tata AIG before the Maharashtra State Commission. The notice was served on July 24, 2013, but the insurance company failed to file its reply within 45 days.

On October 15, 2013, Tata's advocate filed his vakala tnama, and sought extension of time to file a reply without even bothering to assign any reason for not having filed it within the statutory time limit. The State Commission refused to grant further time and held that the opponent's right to file its reply stood forfeited.

Tata challenged this order by filing a revision petition before the National Commission. Tata argued that there were several judgments under the Civil Procedure Code where it had been held that there could be a number of genuine reasons for the inability to file a reply within the statutory period, and that in such cases the court could grant extension of time.

Rejecting this argument, the National Commission observed that even those judgments did not lay down that extension of time was a matter of right. The time schedule stipulated by law would haveto be followed, and any deviation would be by way of exception. A request for extension of time cannot be granted just as a matter of routine and merely for the asking. A written application giving the reasons for seeking such extension would have to be made by the opponents, and the court would grant extension only if it is satisfied that the reasons given are exceptional, genuine and beyond the control of the opponents. Even then costs may be imposed.

The National Commission also observed there was a direct judgment of the Supreme Court in respect of proceedings under the Consumer Protection Act, where a 3-judge bench, in Dr J J Merchant v/s Srinath Chaturvedi, had held that the mandate of the law requiring the reply to be filed within a particular time frame must be strictly adhered to.

The National Commission also noted that Tatas had neither made any application before the State Commission to explain why the reply was not filed within 45 days, nor had they given any reason for seeking extension of time. Even the revision petition before the National Commission had failed to disclose this information. Accordingly, the National Commission upheld the order of the State Commission to proceed with the adjudication of the complaint without allowing Tata to file its reply. (Judgment dated January 6, 2014 delivered by Justice S M Malik for the Bench along with Dr S M Kantikar.)

Impact: A consumer should not object to just one extension which may be given in the interests of justice to decide the dispute fairly after hearing both sides.

But if an opponent is not diligent or seeks extension of time repeatedly, consumers should object to such dilatory tactics and insist that the complaint be proceeded without the reply of the opponent. Only then will opponents take the proceedings seriously.

Article referred: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Company-tardy-in-filing-court-reply-loses-right-to-be-heard/articleshow/28726259.cms

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