Supreme Court: The constitutional bench comprising of R.M. Lodha, CJ and A. K. Patnaik, S.J. Mukhopadhaya, Dipak Misra and Fakkir Kalifulla, JJ in reference to the Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 102, held that insertion of Article 21A and Article 15(5) of the Constitution by the Eighty-Sixth (2002) and Ninety-Third (2005) Amendment, respectively, does not alter the Basic Structure of the Constitution and is constitutionally valid in particular reference to private-unaided schools. The Court emphasized upon the failure of Article 15 in achieving the goal of 'equal treatment without discrimination by State' to hold Article 15(5) of the Constitution as a necessary addition and that Article 21A was inserted to give effect to the Directive Principle of State regarding education in Article 45 of the Constitution. The Court then elucidated that the right of private educational institutions under Article 19(1)(g) was not destroyed by admissions, free-ships or scholarships to educationally and socially backward classes of citizens as well as the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which in actuality are necessary to achieve the constitutional goals of equality of opportunity and social justice set out in the Preamble of the Constitution. [Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India; Writ Petition © No. 416 of 2012; Decided on May 06, 2014]
Court approached in the early stages of arbitration will prevail in all other subsequent proceedings
In National Highway Authority of India v. Hindustan Steelworks Construction Limited, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court opined that once the parties have approached a certain court for relief under Act at earlier stages of disputes then it is same court that, parties must return to for all other subsequent proceedings. Language of Section 42 of Act is categorical and brooks no exception. In fact, the language used has the effect of jurisdiction of all courts since it states that once an application has been made in Part I of the Act then ―that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court. Court holds that NHAI in present case cannot take advantage of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for explaining inordinate delay in filing present petition under Section 34 of this Act in this Court.
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