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Purchaser of litigated property cannot stop claim of decree holder - P&H High Court

Punjab and Haryana High Court: In a case relating to restriction and objection of property of a transferee pendente lite, the Court ruled that Order 21, Rule 102 of Civil Procedure Code is not applicable in such cases. Placing reliance on Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram (2008) 7 SCC144 where the Supreme Court held that a third party purchasing property from a party to the suit which is the subject matter of litigation, cannot restrict the rightful claim of the decree holder.

The Court discussed Order 21 of C.P.C Rule Nos. 97, 98 and 102, wherein it is laid down that in case the decree holder’s possession is being restricted then an application can be filed in the Court upon which the Court shall adjudicate. Rule 102 specifically excludes transferee pendente lite from seeking any relief under Rule Nos. 97 and 98. The Court observed the language of Order 21 Rule 98 and 102 C.P.C., and said that any alienation recorded during the pendency of the suit would not in any way place any fetter upon the rights of a decree holder to seek possession of the suit property which has been alienated ostensibly to defeat the rights of the decree holder. As per the Court, the pendency of the suit is a Constructive Notice to the third party transferee. Rule 102 recognizes the doctrine of lis pendens as enshrined in S. 52 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to protect the decree holder. Thus the decree holder invoking Rule 102 has to show that that the person resisting the possession or offering obstruction is claiming his title to the property after the institution of the suit in which decree was passed and sought to be executed against the judgment debtor. [Harjit Kaur v. Vinod Kumar, Civil Revision No. 4622 of 2013, decided on March 4, 2014.]

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