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S. 43(5)(a): Loss on foreign currency forward contracts by a manufacturer/ exporter is a “speculation loss” and not a “hedging loss”

Araska Diamond Pvt. Ltd vs. ACIT (ITAT Mumbai)

Unless the assessee shows that there was some existing contract in respect of which he was likely to suffer a loss because of future price fluctuations and that it was to safeguard against such loss that he entered into the forward contracts of sale, he could not claim the benefit of clause (a) of the proviso to section 43(5).

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From the principles laid down by above mentioned judgments one thing becomes clear that for hedging transaction commodity dealt should be the same. If the subject matter of the transactions is different it cannot be termed a hedging transaction.

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In order that forward transactions in commodities may fall within proviso (a) to section 43(5) of the Act, it is necessary that the raw materials or merchandise in respect of which the forward transactions have been made by the assessee must have a direct connection with the goods manufactured or the merchandise sold by him. In other words raw material in respect of which the assessee has entered into forward transactions must be the same raw material which is used by him in his manufacturing business. We find that in the case under consideration assessee was not dealing in Foreign Exchange, therefore transactions entered into by it in Foreign Exchange cannot be held to be hedging transactions. As the assessee is dealing in diamonds and FC entered into only for diamonds would have been covered by the proviso (a) to the section 43(5) of the Act. (Contra view in Intergold (I) Ltd, Bombay Diamond Co. Ltd, Friends and Friends Shipping & Badridas Gauridu 261 ITR 256 (Bom) distinguished)

Article referred: http://itatonline.org/archives/araska-diamond-pvt-ltd-vs-acit-itat-mumbai/

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