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Senior citizen gets 5L compensation in accident case. "Public place" defined

A senior citizen was awarded a compensation of Rs 5.13 lakh by the Thane Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on Monday. The 73-year-old woman had lost one of her legs after a speeding car ran over her in her housing complex in 2011.

Sessions court judge S Y Kulkarni ordered Sweety Jitendra Shah, who was the owner of the car, and National Insurance Company to jointly pay the compensation to the victim with a 7% interest within a period of one month. If they fail to do so, then they will have to pay an additional 2% interest till realization, the judge said.

The case dates to January 24, 2011, when the victim, Gumphabai Patil, was sitting in her building garden, along with her grandchildren, at 4.45pm when Sweety's driver lost control of the car and rammed into Patil. Since the car ran over her legs, Patil sustained severe injuries and her left leg had to be amputated.

While Sweety was not present for the proceedings, the insurance company argued that the claim was not tenable as the place where the accident took place was not a public area and the driver did not have a valid license.

However, the forum dismissed both the submissions and awarded the compensation to the senior citizen. The insurance company, in its submission, said that the accident had not taken place in a public place as contemplated in the Motor Vehicles Act. So, the application was not tenable and liable to be dismissed.

But the judge said, ''The scope of definition of public places under the act is wide enough to include any place that members of public use and to which they have a right of access. The right of access may be permissive, limited, restricted or regulated by oral or written permission by tickets, passes or badges or on payment of fees."

Article referred: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/thane/Senior-citizen-gets-5L-compensation-in-accident-case/articleshow/45181359.cms

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