The Allahabad High Court found the definition of a 'workman' in the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act so anomalous that it requested the government to amend it. But the Supreme Court observed that the high court had exceeded its jurisdiction by asking the legislature to change the law. In the judgment delivered last week in Pepsico India Holding Ltd vs K K Pandey, the apex court stated that the high court should not have asked the government to amend the definition of 'workman'. According to the Act, anyone who draws a salary above Rs 500 per month could not be considered a workman and he is beyond the purview of the law. Pepsico terminated a fleet executive and he challenged the management's action. The company invoked the rule and said that since he was drawing a salary of about Rs 8,000, he could not move the labour court. His plea was dismissed by the labour court. But on appeal, the high court said that the rule was an archaic hangover of the 1947 Act when the money value was high. The high court considered the executive as a workman and asked the labour court to consider his petition. The firm appealed to the Supreme Court. It set aside the high court order.
Court approached in the early stages of arbitration will prevail in all other subsequent proceedings
In National Highway Authority of India v. Hindustan Steelworks Construction Limited, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court opined that once the parties have approached a certain court for relief under Act at earlier stages of disputes then it is same court that, parties must return to for all other subsequent proceedings. Language of Section 42 of Act is categorical and brooks no exception. In fact, the language used has the effect of jurisdiction of all courts since it states that once an application has been made in Part I of the Act then ―that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court. Court holds that NHAI in present case cannot take advantage of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for explaining inordinate delay in filing present petition under Section 34 of this Act in this Court.
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