Skip to main content

Cheque bounce case can be filed in jurisdiction of 'drawee bank'

In a significant judgment, the Bombay high court has ruled that in cheque bounce cases, only the drawee bank's jurisdiction could be considered during criminal proceedings under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments (NI) Act, 1881, even as the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system facility enabled citizens to draw/pay cheques at any branches all over the country.

Justice SB Shukre of the Nagpur bench of the HC observed: "There can be only one drawee bank and not several. When the RTGS cheques bear an endorsement payable at all our branches', it only means 'payment instructions expedited' enabling receipt thereof immediately."

The HC was hearing a petition filed by one Sangita Shah against one Sukrant Shah. The judicial magistrate first class, Nagpur, had returned her complaint against Sukrant on November 3, 2014. Following this, she had filed a writ petition in the HC.

While dismissing Shah's petition, the judge made it clear that there is a difference between 'processing of cheque for payment', and 'giving approval to the processing branch' for the payment. "The branch which processes the cheque and obtains approval for payment from the original branch where funds are actually parked, can only be called as the facilitator. It can't be termed as the 'drawee' under Section 7 of the NI Act," observed the HC.

Nagpur-based Sangita had lodged a complaint against her father-in-law, who is based in Jamshedpur, for dishonouring a Rs2.25 crore cheque. She filed a complaint with the Nagpur magistrate under the NI Act stating that since RTGS system is in existence, the criminal proceedings should be conducted in Nagpur. However, the JMFC rejected the complaint and returned the same saying that she should file it in Jamshedpur where the bank, which had bounced the cheque, was located.

She challenged this before the HC through advocate AP Raghute contending that the concept of the 'drawee bank' was enlarged after RTGS wherein payments are made at any of the branches of the same bank, across the country. Therefore, all bank branches, for offences under the NI Act, can act as the 'drawee bank'.

Sukrant's advocate, Rajendra Daga, argued that RTGS is only for expediting payment and that doesn't expand the concept of 'drawee bank'.

Justice Shukre cited RBI guidelines and observed that RTGS is meant for facilitating speedy payment by reducing the time for processing cheques and it has got nothing to do with the 'drawee bank'.

He said: "In conventional processing, considerable time is spent on obtaining instructions from the branch on which cheque is drawn. RTGS saves this by resorting to the modern technology which has, through web-world or Internet, made it possible to quickly access information including those contained in accounts."

The judge said the RBI has made it clear that 'Real Time' is the time taken for processing of instructions after they are received while 'Gross Settlement' means the settlement of funds transfer instructions which occurs individually.

"The cheques are immediately processed by the branch to which they are presented because of the fact that funds are to be settled only in the RBI books. What is contemplated under RTGS is only transfer of funds by the 'drawee bank' to other branches which received the cheques. It means that dishonouring of cheque takes place because of failure or refusal to transfer funds which takes place at the place where the 'drawee bank' is situated," added justice Shukre while dismissing the petition.

Article referred: http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report-cheque-bounce-case-can-be-filed-in-jurisdiction-of-drawee-bank-says-bombay-high-court-2054891

Comments

Most viewed this month

Amendment of plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC explained

Cause Title :  Ganesh Prasad vs Rajeshwar Prasad, SLP (C) NO. 28377 OF 2018, Supreme Court Of India Date of Judgment/Order : 14/3/2023 Corum : J. B. Pardiwala, J. Citied:  Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy & Sons and Others reported in (2009) 10 SCC 84 North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur v. Bhagwan Das reported in (2008) 8 SCC 511 P.A. Jayalakshmi v. H. Saradha and Others reported in (2009) 14 SCC 525 B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai and Another reported in (2000) 1 SCC 712 A.K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corporation reported in AIR 1967 SC 96 Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited and Another, Civil Appeal No. 5909 of 2022 dated 01.09.2022 Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad and Others reported in AIR 1951 SC 177 G. Nagamma and Another v. Siromanamma and Another reported in (1996) 2 SCC 25 Praful Manohar Rele v. Krishnabai Narayan Ghosalkar and Others reported in (2014...

Interim order staying the operation of an impugned order vs quashment of an impugned order

In Deific Abode LLP vs Union of India & Ors., while discussing on the issue of interim order staying the operation of an impugned order and the quashment of an impugned order, the Calcutta High Court observed that :- These salient principles emerge: i. As per the law laid down in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd (supra) by the Supreme Court, the effect of an interim order staying the operation of an impugned order and the quashment of an impugned order are considerably different from one another. While the former merely ensures that the order impugned would not be operative from the date of the passing of the order of stay, without annihilating the said impugned order from existence, the latter ensures that such quashment results in the restoration of the position as it stood on the date the impugned order was passed, with the impugned order ceasing to exist in the eyes of the law. ii. Quashment of such impugned order would revive the appeal before the appellate authority and would be con...

Ruling on applicability of threshold limit for withholding obligation in relation to sale of immovable property

In Vinod Soni and others (Taxpayer) v. ITO, the issue before the Delhi Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was whether any withholding obligation triggers on the joint buyers if the cost of the immoveable property is more than specified limit of INR5M but the share of each co-owner is less than that value. Income tax laws cast an obligation on the buyer to withhold tax on payment to seller of consideration for transfer of immoveable property if value of consideration exceeds INR5M. The Tribunal held that in a case of joint acquisition of an immovable property by various co-owners, the threshold limit of withholding obligation (i.e. INR5M) is applicable with reference to share of each co-owner and not with reference to consideration of entire property. Accordingly, the Tribunal deleted tax withholding demand raised on co-owners by the Tax Authority. Article referred: https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/delhitrib/%24FILE/delhitrib.pdf