Skip to main content

Definition of "charitable purpose" not to be construed literally

India Trade Promotion Organization vs. DGIT (E) (Delhi High Court)

S. 2(15)/ 10(23C)(iv): If the definition of "charitable purpose" is construed literally, it is violative of the principles of equality & unconstitutional. If the dominant object is not to carry on business or trade or commerce, then an incidental or ancillary activity for which a fee is charged does not destroy the character of a charitable institution

The DGIT (E) passed an order stating that though the assessee is engaged in “the advancement of any other object of general public utility” as per s. 2(15) of the Act, its object could not be regarded as “charitable purposes” due to the new proviso to s. 2(15) and that it was not eligible for exemption u/s 10(23C)(iv). It was held that as the assessee had huge surpluses in banks, it had given its space for rent during Trade Fairs and Exhibitions, it had received income by way of sale of tickets and income from food and beverage outlets in Pragati Maidan, etc, the assessee was rendering service to a large number of traders and industrialists in relation to trade, commerce and business and was, therefore, hit by the expanded list of activities contained in the proviso to Section 2(15). It was further observed that the service of allotting space and other amenities like water, electricity and security, etc. to the traders to conduct their exhibitions fell within the ambit of any activity of rendering any service in relation to trade, commerce or business. The assessee filed a writ petition claiming that the First Proviso to s. 2(15), as amended by the Finance Act, 2008, is arbitrary and unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. HELD by the High Court:

(i) It is apparent that merely because a fee or some other consideration is collected or received by an institution, it would not lose its character of having been established for a charitable purpose. It is also important to note as to what is the dominant activity of the institution in question. If the dominant activity of the institution was not business, trade or commerce, then any such incidental or ancillary activity would also not fall within the categories of trade, commerce or business. It is clear from the facts of the present case that the driving force is not the desire to earn profits but, the object of promoting trade and commerce not for itself, but for the nation – both within India and outside India. Clearly, this is a charitable purpose, which has as its motive the advancement of an object of general public utility to which the exception carved out in the first proviso to Section 2(15) of the said Act would not apply;

(ii) If a literal interpretation were to be given to the said proviso, then it would risk being hit by Article 14 (the equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution). It is well-settled that the courts should always endeavour to uphold the Constitutional validity of a provision and, in doing so, the provision in question may have to be read down;

(iii) Section 2(15) is only a definition clause. The expression “charitable purpose” appearing in Section 2(15) of the said Act has to be seen in the context of Section 10(23C)(iv). When the expression “charitable purpose”, as defined in Section 2(15) of the said Act, is read in the context of Section 10(23C)(iv) of the said Act, we would have to give up the strict and literal interpretation sought to be given to the expression “charitable purpose” by the revenue;

(iv) Conclusion: The expression “charitable purpose”, as defined in Section 2(15) cannot be construed literally and in absolute terms. It has to take colour and be considered in the context of Section 10(23C)(iv) of the said Act. It is also clear that if the literal interpretation is given to the proviso to Section 2(15) of the said Act, then the proviso would be at risk of running foul of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution India. In order to save the Constitutional validity of the proviso, the same would have to be read down and interpreted in the context of Section 10(23C)(iv) because, in our view, the context requires such an interpretation. The correct interpretation of the proviso to Section 2(15) of the said Act would be that it carves out an exception from the charitable purpose of advancement of any other object of general public utility and that exception is limited to activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business or any activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business for a cess or fee or any other consideration. In both the activities, in the nature of trade, commerce or business or the activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business, the dominant and the prime objective has to be seen. If the dominant and prime objective of the institution, which claims to have been established for charitable purposes, is profit making, whether its activities are directly in the nature of trade, commerce or business or indirectly in the rendering of any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business, then it would not be entitled to claim its object to be a ‘charitable purpose’. On the flip side, where an institution is not driven primarily by a desire or motive to earn profits, but to do charity through the advancement of an object of general public utility, it cannot but be regarded as an institution established for charitable purposes (Info Parks Kerala v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax (2010) 329 ITR 404 (Ker) and Andhra Pradesh State Seed Certification Agency v. Chief Commissioner of Income-tax-III, Hyderabad 256 CTR 380 (AP) dissented from).

Comments

Most viewed this month

Amendment of plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC explained

Cause Title :  Ganesh Prasad vs Rajeshwar Prasad, SLP (C) NO. 28377 OF 2018, Supreme Court Of India Date of Judgment/Order : 14/3/2023 Corum : J. B. Pardiwala, J. Citied:  Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy & Sons and Others reported in (2009) 10 SCC 84 North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur v. Bhagwan Das reported in (2008) 8 SCC 511 P.A. Jayalakshmi v. H. Saradha and Others reported in (2009) 14 SCC 525 B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai and Another reported in (2000) 1 SCC 712 A.K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corporation reported in AIR 1967 SC 96 Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited and Another, Civil Appeal No. 5909 of 2022 dated 01.09.2022 Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad and Others reported in AIR 1951 SC 177 G. Nagamma and Another v. Siromanamma and Another reported in (1996) 2 SCC 25 Praful Manohar Rele v. Krishnabai Narayan Ghosalkar and Others reported in (2014...

Interim order staying the operation of an impugned order vs quashment of an impugned order

In Deific Abode LLP vs Union of India & Ors., while discussing on the issue of interim order staying the operation of an impugned order and the quashment of an impugned order, the Calcutta High Court observed that :- These salient principles emerge: i. As per the law laid down in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd (supra) by the Supreme Court, the effect of an interim order staying the operation of an impugned order and the quashment of an impugned order are considerably different from one another. While the former merely ensures that the order impugned would not be operative from the date of the passing of the order of stay, without annihilating the said impugned order from existence, the latter ensures that such quashment results in the restoration of the position as it stood on the date the impugned order was passed, with the impugned order ceasing to exist in the eyes of the law. ii. Quashment of such impugned order would revive the appeal before the appellate authority and would be con...

Ruling on applicability of threshold limit for withholding obligation in relation to sale of immovable property

In Vinod Soni and others (Taxpayer) v. ITO, the issue before the Delhi Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was whether any withholding obligation triggers on the joint buyers if the cost of the immoveable property is more than specified limit of INR5M but the share of each co-owner is less than that value. Income tax laws cast an obligation on the buyer to withhold tax on payment to seller of consideration for transfer of immoveable property if value of consideration exceeds INR5M. The Tribunal held that in a case of joint acquisition of an immovable property by various co-owners, the threshold limit of withholding obligation (i.e. INR5M) is applicable with reference to share of each co-owner and not with reference to consideration of entire property. Accordingly, the Tribunal deleted tax withholding demand raised on co-owners by the Tax Authority. Article referred: https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/delhitrib/%24FILE/delhitrib.pdf