Skip to main content

Stamp duty to be paid on when borrowing from multiple banks

A two judge bench of the Supreme Court of India in Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Coastal Gujarat Power Ltd. (Civil Appeal No. 6054 of 2015 arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 32319 of 2013) has set aside an order passed by the High Court of Gujarat on 3 December 2012 in Stamp Reference No. 1/2011, holding that a mortgage deed with security trustee to secure loans of multiple banks would be treated as distinct transactions and would be liable for stamp duty as if separate mortgage deeds were recorded for each bank

The High Court had observed that the stamp duty is payable on the instrument and not the transaction. As per the High Court the instrument was a mortgage deed between a borrower (mortgagor) and a security trustee (mortgagee). It was the security trustee alone who had the power to enforce the mortgage and not the banks. The High Court observed that Section 5 cannot be construed to empower the State to levy duty on the transaction as opposed to the instrument and since there is only one instrument creating mortgage in favour of the security trustee, the relationship between the thirteen lenders and the borrower was independent from that of the borrower and the security trustee.

This judgment is of course only valid for Gujarat which has a specific clause to deal with this situation under Gujarat Stamp Act.

Comments

Most viewed this month

One Sided Clauses In Builder-Buyer Agreements Is An Unfair Trade Practice

In CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12238 OF 2018, Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. vs Govindan Raghavan, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court  by the builder against the order of the National Consumer Forum. The builder had relied upon various clauses of the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement to refute the claim of the respondent but was rejected by the commission which found the said clauses as wholly one-sided, unfair and unreasonable, and could not be relied upon. The Supreme Court on perusal of the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement found stark incongruities between the remedies available to both the parties. For example, Clause 6.4 (ii) of the Agreement entitles the Appellant – Builder to charge Interest @18% p.a. on account of any delay in payment of installments from the Respondent – Flat Purchaser. Clause 6.4 (iii) of the Agreement entitles the Appellant – Builder to cancel the allotment and terminate the Agreement, if any installment remains in arrears for more than 30 da...

Inherited property of childless hindu woman devolve onto heirs of her parents

In Tarabai Dagdu Nitanware vs Narayan Keru Nitanware, quashing an order passed by a joint civil judge junior division, Pune, the Bombay High Court has held that under Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother, will devolve upon the heirs of her father/mother, if she dies without any children of her own, and not upon her husband. Justice Shalini Phansalkar Joshi was hearing a writ petition filed by relatives of one Sundarabai, who died issueless more than 45 years ago on June 18, 1962. Article referred:http://www.livelaw.in/property-inherited-female-hindu-parents-shall-devolve-upon-heirs-father-not-husband-dies-childless-bombay-hc-read-judgment/

Court approached in the early stages of arbitration will prevail in all other subsequent proceedings

In National Highway Authority of India v. Hindustan Steelworks Construction Limited, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court opined that once the parties have approached a certain court for relief under Act at earlier stages of disputes then it is same court that, parties must return to for all other subsequent proceedings. Language of Section 42 of Act is categorical and brooks no exception. In fact, the language used has the effect of jurisdiction of all courts since it states that once an application has been made in Part I of the Act then ―that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court. Court holds that NHAI in present case cannot take advantage of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for explaining inordinate delay in filing present petition under Section 34 of this Act in this Court.