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Dept. enquiry and criminal complaint can run simultanously

In ANJAN BISWAS vs CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA AND OTHER, the petitioner’s submission was that either a public employer not lodge a criminal complaint against an employee who is perceived to have committed a criminal offence and against whom a departmental action is  initiated; or, if a criminal complaint is lodged in respect of the same matters, the departmental action has to be suspended till the criminal trial is concluded.

In reply while dismissing the Writ petition, the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court decided that -
........
24. The life of law may be experience and not logic, but that does not imply that the law is illogical or asinine. That criminal matters are not disposed of in a hurry in this country is a matter of public knowledge and has been judicially recognised for decades. Notwithstanding the present fashion of
even questioning the obvious and irrefutable by taking advantage of the rules of evidence, the judicial system cannot be mocked by suggesting the absurd. While a civilised process demands a charge to be proved upon the person charged being afforded an opportunity to defend himself, it cannot be said that merely because a criminal complaint has been filed in respect of the same set of transactions that form the subject-matter of an earlier or later disciplinary action, the disciplinary action will be stultified till the criminal case, or the trial therein, is concluded. Judicial notice must be taken of cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 that stretch beyond the service-life of the accused or even their lifetimes. It may not be reasonable to accept that a public employer has to suffer a perceived corrupt employee till the charge of corruption is proved in the criminal case. The same principle would apply to any employee charged by a public employer of other misconduct.

25. Again, a public employer cannot be faulted for instituting a criminal action against an employee perceived to have committed a criminal offence and, thereby, forfeit the right of pursuing any disciplinary proceedings against such employee. Indeed, it may be obligatory on the part of a public
employer to bring an offender to justice. In the ideal, utopian State, criminal trials should be concluded without undue delay. But this is not the place to discuss why criminal trials take so long or complain of the lack of infrastructure or resources at the command of the judiciary or even refer
to the planted stories in a section of the media of the inadequacies of judges with no one to speak on the judges’ behalf. Yes, there may be inadequacies in the personnel and in the system; but that is only a halftruth that is fanned by the relentless onslaught against the judiciary to emasculate it and, thereby, replace the rule of law by the law of the rule. So as not to digress any further, it would suffice to merely notice that the criminal justice system takes more time than may be desirable. But the
delay in such process cannot be made the basis for destroying discipline at the public workplace by applying the guarded rule in Paul Anthony to every departmental action.

26. The charges against the petitioner herein are straight-forward and do not involve any complicated questions of law or fact for the departmental action against the petitioner to be arrested till the outcome of the criminal case lodged against him. This is not an indictment of the petitioner; just as
the judgment of January 18, 2016 on the petitioner’s plea of quashing the earlier departmental proceedings against him on the basis of his order of acquittal in the connected criminal matter was not an acceptance of the petitioner’s culpability in the misconduct alleged against him. The judgment of January 18, 2016 and the view expressed herein are two sides of the coin, so to say, of the same principle. An acquittal of an accused of the criminal charges, without the criminal court affirmatively establishing his innocence, would not destroy the edifice of a pending departmental action on the same set of facts. Likewise, when the standards of proof in the two set of actions are distinct, the impending criminal trial on the same set of allegations cannot be a shield to an employee charged in a
departmental action to keep the disciplinary proceedings indefinitely at bay.


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