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Probate proceedings establishes prima facie interest and conclusive proof not needed

In Saroj Agarwalla (Dead) Thr. LR Abhishek Agrawalla Vs. Yasheel Jain, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that held that mere receipt of some benefits under the Will cannot confer a caveatable interest in a third party unless he claims interest in the estate of the deceased otherwise than by way of Will sought to be probated. But the conclusions of the Single Judge were upheld on the basis of claim of Malati that she was widow of the testator. The Division Bench came to hold that the issue whether Malati is really a lawful widow of the testator or not cannot be conclusively decided in the probate proceedings but once prima facie materials support her claim, the application filed for discharge of her caveat deserves dismissal. This view is founded on the reason furnished by Division Bench by pointing out that a judgment in the probate proceedings is a judgment in rem and, therefore, a person establishing prima facie interest in the estate of the testator should be permitted to maintain a caveat and contest a claim for probate. At this stage, it is not necessary to establish caveatable interest by conclusive proof. The Division Bench finally made it clear that all its observations were tentative and such observations will not be binding upon the parties or upon any other court if the status of Malati is questioned in any proceedings.

The Hon'ble court further held that in the case of Ishwardeo Narain Singh v. Kamta Devi, AIR 1954 SC 280, this Court pointed out that “the Court of Probate is only concerned with the question as to whether the document put forward as the last will and testament of a deceased person was duly executed and attested in accordance with law and whether at the time of such execution the testator had sound disposing mind. The question whether a particular bequest is good or bad is not within the purview of the Probate Court.”


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