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Court can interfere with departmental authority’s unfair decision

IN Praneet v. State of Punjab and Ors., High Court of Punjab and Haryana writ petition has been preferred seeking to challenge findings of inquiry report and for writ in nature of certiorari to quash impugned order by which punishment of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect has been imposed by Respondent No. 1. On basis of irregularities in voter list pertaining to village Mubarak which includes delay in sending record to office of State Election Commission, amongst another charge, Petitioner was served with a Memo. Petitioner submitted a detailed reply and brought factual aspect of matter to notice of authorities. Thereafter, a charge sheet was issued to the Petitioner at instance of State Election Commission, and Commissioner, Jalandhar was appointed as an Inquiry Officer who submitted his report to Chief Secretary. Petitioner submitted that, punishment has been imposed after an inordinate delay of five years on completion of inquiry. Questions that requires to be decided in instant writ petition are, whether there is a delay in imposition of penalty after conclusion of the inquiry and the effect thereof; and whether there is violation of Rules 8(23)(i) and 24 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1970.

This Court cannot sit as a Court of appeal over findings given in inquiry report or on matter of punishment imposed upon a delinquent officer. However, as held in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay versus Shashikant S. Patil, interference with decision of a departmental authority can be permitted in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, (i) if such authority had held proceedings in violation of principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing mode of inquiry; and (ii) if a decision of authority is vitiated by consideration extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case or if conclusion made by authority on very face of it is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion.

In instant case, there has been an inordinate delay in imposing punishment. State is expected to act in a fair manner which would necessarily mean to act in accordance with law and with promptitude. In case, there is a delay in issuance of a charge sheet, Courts are known to have stepped in to rescue of delinquent officer. It is also well settled that a person would be denied relief in case, he does not approach Courts in time by applying law of limitation and invoking the principles of delay and latches. Therefore, delay in imposing punishment after an inordinate delay of 5 years and thereby keeping Damocles' sword hanging, is certainly not warranted, when coupled with fact that, inquiry is vitiated. 

High Court opined that, inquiry report suffers from vice of being in violation of Rule 8(23)(i) of Punjab Civil Service (Punishment and Appeal) Rules 1970 as there is no discussion of evidence produced on record by Petitioner and findings are contrary to evidence on record. Inquiry report itself is vitiated and any punishment thereto would be unsustainable.

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