Skip to main content

For a binding contract, putative offer must reveal an intention to give rise, upon acceptance, to an obligation

In Levingston v. Levingston (Australia), Robert Ian Edwin Partridge died on 6 October 2008. By his will made on 29 December 1995, he appointed Appellant, Mrs. Lola Levingston, as his executrix and left his estate to his only son, Mr. Rhys Partridge, second Respondent. Late Mr. Partridge and Mrs. Levingston lived together as husband and wife for 12 years prior to his death. Mrs. Levingston appeals against dismissal of her action in which she claimed that, late Mr. Partridge agreed to leave her his entire estate or, alternatively, his personal estate. Appellant’s primary claim was in contract and based on a letter dated 13 April 2005 that, she and Ian signed and sent to their solicitor. Mrs. Levingston claimed that, letter constituted an agreement in writing between Ian and Mrs. Levingston, terms of which were that Ian would be entitled to live in a property owned by Mrs. Levingston for rest of his life, and her will would so provide, and Ian would leave his personal estate to Mrs. Levingston.

Primary judge found that, constructive and resulting trust claims failed as a consequence of failure of Mrs. Levingston's contract and estoppel claims. Primary Judge observed that, language of letter does not suggest the existence of an agreement. Absence of any words reflecting existence of a consensus was described by primary judge as a significant factor in his reasoning that Ian and Mrs. Levingston did not have an intention to create contractual relations. Evident purpose of letter was not to make an agreement but to provide documents to their lawyer and to set out legal advice they required from him. Ian and Mrs. Levingston had not documented any of their financial dealings with each other, as they trusted one another. That suggested, it was unlikely that Ian and Mrs. Levingston intended to create a binding agreement between them in relation to their respective testamentary intentions. Primary judge concluded that, they both signed letter in order to assure Mr Meyer that, contents of letter reflected their instructions.

 In order that a contract be constituted by an offer and acceptance, putative offer must reveal an intention to give rise, upon acceptance, to an obligation. Intention is assessed objectively; that is done by reference to what is conveyed to a reasonable person in the position of parties by what was said and done, and having regard to circumstances in which those statements and conduct happened. In making that assessment, conduct of parties subsequent to making of alleged agreement may be taken into account. As primary judge pointed out, it is important to notice that Mrs. Levingston's case is that, letter of 13 April 2005 constituted agreement. It was not said to evidence an agreement that had been made orally or by conduct. Nor does Mrs. Levingston allege that, parties made an inferred agreement without an identifiable offer and acceptance. Thus, language and evident purpose of letter is of central significance. In cases where a letter is said to constitute an agreement, letter would usually be sent by one party to agreement to other party to agreement. That is not so in present case. Rather, letter is sent by two alleged parties to agreement to a third person - their solicitor - who is not said to be a party to alleged agreement.

Comments

Post a Comment

Most viewed this month

Appellate authorities under Special Statutes cannot be asked to condone delay

Madras High Court in R.Gowrishankar vs. The Commissioner of Service Tax has held that Appellate authorities cannot be asked to condone the delay, beyond the extended period of limitation A Division Bench comprising of Justices S. Manikumar and D. Krishnakumar, made this observation while considering an appeal filed against Single Bench order declining to set aside the order made in the condone delay petition filed by the petitioner to condone 223 days in filing the appeal before the Commissioner of Service Tax (Appeals). Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/appellate-authorities-special-statutes-cannot-asked-condone-delay-beyond-extended-period-limitation-madras-hc/
Post a Comment
Read more

'Seize assets to pay damages to accident victim'

Her story might be an inspiration for the physically challenged but justice has remained elusive for her. In 2008, a bus accident left research engineer S Thenmozhi, 30, paraplegic. In April 2013, the motor accident claims tribunal directed the Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (TNSTC) to provide her a compensation of 57.9 lakh. However, TNSTC refused to budge and on Tuesday a city court ordered attaching of movable assets of the transport corporation. Thenmozhi was employed in C-DOT, a telecom technology development centre in Bangalore. On July 21, 2008, she was coming to Chennai in a private bus. Around 2am, the bus had a flat tyre and the driver parked it on the left side of the road near Pallikonda in Vellore district on the Bangalore-Chennai highway. While the tyre was being changed, a TNSTC bus of Dharmapuri division hit the stationary bus. The rear part of the bus was smashed and passengers were injured. Thenmozhi who had a seat at the back of the bus suffered...
Post a Comment
Read more

Mumbai ITAT rules income of offshore discretionary trust is subject to tax in India

The Mumbai Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) has recently determined the following issue in the affirmative in the case of Manoj Dhupelia: Should the income of an offshore discretionary trust be subject to tax in India, if no distributions have been made to beneficiaries in India? The question arose from appeals filed by individual beneficiaries in relation to a Lichtenstein-based trust, the Ambrunova Trust and Merlyn Management SA (the Trust) with the ITAT. It is important to note that the individuals in this case were amongst those first identified by the Government of India (GOI) as holding undeclared bank accounts in Lichtenstein. The ITAT ruling raises the following issues: Taxation of Trust Corpus: ITAT classified the corpus of the trust as "undisclosed income" and declared it taxable in the hands of the beneficiaries. Taxation of Undistributed Income: ITAT refused to draw a distinction between the corpus and undistributed income from the trust and declared i...
Post a Comment
Read more