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A registering authority has to stay within the statue prescribed for it

In Tata Motors Finance Ltd. Vs. State Transport Authority, the issue before the Orissa High Court was that the Transport Authority was refusing endorsement and termination of the hypothecation in the certificate of registration as according to the authority the company's trade license has expired.

The Court held that, as the power has been vested with the registering authority by the statute prescribing the manner of endorsement and termination of the hypothecation in the certificate of registration, the registering authority has to discharge its duty, without taking into consideration any ancillary or corollary reasons, in consonance with the provisions contained under Section 51 of the Act, 1988 read with Rules, 60 and 61 of the Rules, 1989. As such, the registering authority cannot refuse endorsement of hypothecation and cancellation thereof in the certificate of registration on the grounds not permissible in law.

It is apt to refer here the legal maxim “Expressio Unius est exclusion alterius” i.e. if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and any other manner are barred. Similar question had come up for consideration before this Court in Subash Chandra Nayak (supra) and this Court in paragraph-8 observed as follows:

In view of the above settled position of law, there is no doubt that if an action is required to be undertaken in a particular manner, then that has to be done in that manner or not at all. Therefore, applying the same to the present context, if the statute specifically provides the manner in which the hypothecation endorsement is to be entered into the certificate of registration and the termination thereof, when an application is made, as has been provided under the statute in Rules 60 and 61 of the Rules, 1989 in the prescribed forms, i.e., Forms-34 and 35 along with the fees, then the registering authority cannot have any option than to follow the law as prescribed under the Act, 1988 read with Rules, 1989. As such, the registering authority cannot and could not have refused to make endorsement or terminate the hypothecation in the certificate of registration, because the financer has not renewed the trade certificate for doing its business in the State. The grant of trade certificate to a financer is only confined to Rule 41(h) of the Rules, 1989. Therefore, the financer cannot use trade certificate for any purpose other than specified under the Rule 41(h) of the Rules, 1989. Thus, the action of the registering authority in refusing to make endorsement of hypothecation and cancellation thereof in the certificate of registration, in the name of renewal of trade certificate, amounts to, not only arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power, but also contrary to the provisions of law.

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