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'Civil Contempt' must be a willful one, a proof of sheer/mere disobedience is not enough

In A. Elangovan Vs. The Inspector of Police, Palaviduthi Police Station and Ors, the Petitioner has preferred the instant Contempt Petition praying for passing of an order by this Court to punish the Respondents for the act of Contempt in not obeying the orders passed by this Court.

The High Court of Madras held that it cannot be gainsaid that, the Contempt jurisdiction is conferred on the High Court not only to preserve or maintain the Majesty of Law by taking necessary action against persons, who violates the Court's order, but to see that the 'Court of Justice' is pure. Furthermore, even an 'Abuse of Process of Court' would amount to Contempt of Court. As a matter of fact, a Civil Contempt pertains to an order of 'Court of Law' affecting the rights of other parties to that order. 

It is to be noted that, the disobedience of orders of Court in order to be a 'Civil Contempt' must be a willful one, a proof of sheer/mere disobedience is not enough. For an effective administration of Justice, the Court 'Exercising' of Contempt jurisdiction is essential concerned with the issue of 'Contumacious' conduct of a person, who is purported to have committed a default in complying with the directions of the order or Judgment. 

As a Court of Law, when it deals with an application for Contempt, it cannot go beyond the order, non-compliance, which was alleged, there ought to be a clear cut case of obstruction of administration of Justice by a party intentionally to bring the matter within the ambit of Contempt. It cannot be forgotten that a 'Civil Contempt is less grave than a Criminal Contempt'. Indeed, the case should not rest on surmises and conjectures. 

In order to sustain an action for Contempt in respect of a violation of an order, it is not necessary that the order must have been served on the party against whom it is ordered, if it is established that he had noticed the order. However, the burden is on the person, who claims that the individual against whom action is allegedly taken, has very much knowledge of the order. But if there is a genuine doubt, then the same will go in favour of the person, who is facing the Contempt. 

In Law, an affected person has no right to insist that, a Court of Law should exercise such jurisdiction, because of the reason that 'Contempt' is between the contemnor and the Court. The proceedings, under Section 107 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) are for maintaining 'Public Peace and Tranquility'. In fact, the proceedings under Section 107 of CrPC. are not punitive in character. That apart, the ingredients of Sections 107 to 109 of CrPC. are there to maintain public peace and to prevent a wrongful act that may cause a breach of peace or disturb the public peace, as the case may be.

Section 107 of CrPC visualises that when an individual is likely to commit breach of peace or disturbed the public tranquility by a direct act and further when the person may be the indirect reason for the cause of the breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquility by indulging in a wrongful act, an Executive Magistrate may take action, as he deems fit and proper, after applying his thinking judicial mind and should not pass a mechanical order just because he had received a 'Report from the Police'. 

The Magistrate can prepare the proceedings on the basis of 'Police Report or Other Information' which ought to be clear so as to offer notice to the persons proceeded against. Under Section 107 of CrPC, an enquiry will commence based upon the nature of show cause furnished by the concerned party. To ascertain the truth of information, an enquiry is commenced by the Magistrate and the enquiry mentioned in Section 116 of CrPC is in the character of trial in summary cases. No wonder, Section 116 of CrPC is to be read along with Section 254 of CrPC. 

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