Skip to main content

High Court on 'Wrong Judgment' and 'Review Petition'

In K.M.TOMAR vs STATE BANK OF INDIA & ORS., the Delhi High Court, rapped litigants for making it a habit of filing review petitions without understanding whether the case was fit for it.

“Some litigants, it appears, are never satisfied. This is being stated by this Court because filing of review petition has now become almost a habit with respect to certain litigants,” Justice Valmiki J. Mehta observed.

The Court also scorned at the practice of lawyers routinely giving out certificates affirming that such review petitions should be filed, observing, “Not only filing of the review petition becoming a habit for certain litigants, the same is also not filed in terms of the rules of this Court, because a review petition must be accompanied by a certificate of the lawyer that the review petition is justified, however, lawyers are routinely giving certificate that the review petition should be filed. Giving of certificates by lawyers in a routine manner defeats the whole purpose of trusting the lawyers that they would only certify a case being fit for review only when it clearly falls within the scope of review jurisdiction.”

It then went on to explain the difference between the two ways in which a judgment can be “wrong”, explaining, “A judgment being ‘wrong’ has two connotations. One is ‘wrong’ for the purpose of review petition and another ‘wrong’ is that the judgment is wrong for the purpose of exercising appellate jurisdiction by the appellate court. What is within the realm of jurisdiction of an appellate court for holding the judgment to be wrong/illegal for being set aside is not within the scope of review petition and which lies only if there is some ex-facie and complete illegality in the impugned judgment i.e. an error apparent on the face of record.”

Comments

Most viewed this month

The recovery of vehicles by the financier not an offence - SC

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 8907  of 2009 Anup Sarmah (Petitioner) Vs Bhola Nath Sharma & Ors.(Respondents) The petitioner submitted that  respondents-financer had forcibly taken away the vehicle financed by them and  illegally deprived the petitioner from its lawful possession  and  thus,  committed  a crime. The complaint filed by the petitioner had been  entertained  by  the Judicial Magistrate (Ist Class), Gauhati (Assam) in Complaint Case  No.  608 of 2009, even directing the interim custody of the vehicle (Maruti  Zen)  be given to the petitioner vide order dated  17.3.2009.  The respondent on approaching the Guwahati High  Court against this order, the hon'ble court squashed the criminal  proceedings  pending   before  the  learned Magistrate. After hearing both sides, the Hon'ble Supreme Court decided on 30th...

Flat owner without legal title has consumer rights

In a significant judgment, the South Mumbai Consumer Forum has held that a flat owner legally occupying the flat would be a consumer, even if his title to the flat might be in dispute before a competent court. Thurlow owned a flat in a co-operative society. Appuswami was residing with him. In 1976, Appuswami got married in the same flat, and his wife started residing in the same flat. They had three children, born and brought up in the same flat. After Thurlow expired in 2004, Appuswami approached the High Court for inheritance to Thurlow's estate but expired while the matter was pending. His wife and children were brought on record. Subsequently, the society intervened, contending Appuswami did not have any right to the flat and it should be handed over to the Society. The Appuswami family continued to reside in the flat, and even pay the society's outgoings and maintenance charges. Later, the society stopped collecting maintenance charges from all members, as it earned...

Court approached in the early stages of arbitration will prevail in all other subsequent proceedings

In National Highway Authority of India v. Hindustan Steelworks Construction Limited, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court opined that once the parties have approached a certain court for relief under Act at earlier stages of disputes then it is same court that, parties must return to for all other subsequent proceedings. Language of Section 42 of Act is categorical and brooks no exception. In fact, the language used has the effect of jurisdiction of all courts since it states that once an application has been made in Part I of the Act then ―that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court. Court holds that NHAI in present case cannot take advantage of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for explaining inordinate delay in filing present petition under Section 34 of this Act in this Court.