Skip to main content

Mere Change Of Opinion Of Assessing Officer Not A Ground For Reassessment

The Supreme Court in ITO vs M/s TechSpan India Private Ltd.  has held that Section 147 of the Income Tax Act does not allow re-assessment of an income merely because of the fact that the assessing officer has change of opinion on the same facts and circumstances which were already in his knowledge even during the original assessment proceedings.

A bench of Justice RK Agrawal and Justice Mohan M Shantanagoudar were considering an appeal filed by the Revenue against Delhi High Court order that had quashed the show cause notice as well as reassessment order.

The court said that the use of the words ‘reason to believe’ in Section 147 has to be interpreted schematically as the liberal interpretation of the word would have the consequence of conferring arbitrary powers on the assessing officer who may even initiate such re-assessment proceedings merely on his change of opinion on the basis of same facts and circumstances which has already been considered by him during the original assessment proceedings.

Section 147 of the IT Act does not allow the re-assessment of an income merely because of the fact that the assessing officer has a change of opinion with regard to the interpretation of law differently on the facts that were well within his knowledge even at the time of assessment. Doing so would have the effect of giving the assessing officer the power of review and Section 147 confers the power to re-assess and not the power to review.

Comments

Most viewed this month

The recovery of vehicles by the financier not an offence - SC

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 8907  of 2009 Anup Sarmah (Petitioner) Vs Bhola Nath Sharma & Ors.(Respondents) The petitioner submitted that  respondents-financer had forcibly taken away the vehicle financed by them and  illegally deprived the petitioner from its lawful possession  and  thus,  committed  a crime. The complaint filed by the petitioner had been  entertained  by  the Judicial Magistrate (Ist Class), Gauhati (Assam) in Complaint Case  No.  608 of 2009, even directing the interim custody of the vehicle (Maruti  Zen)  be given to the petitioner vide order dated  17.3.2009.  The respondent on approaching the Guwahati High  Court against this order, the hon'ble court squashed the criminal  proceedings  pending   before  the  learned Magistrate. After hearing both sides, the Hon'ble Supreme Court decided on 30th...

Flat owner without legal title has consumer rights

In a significant judgment, the South Mumbai Consumer Forum has held that a flat owner legally occupying the flat would be a consumer, even if his title to the flat might be in dispute before a competent court. Thurlow owned a flat in a co-operative society. Appuswami was residing with him. In 1976, Appuswami got married in the same flat, and his wife started residing in the same flat. They had three children, born and brought up in the same flat. After Thurlow expired in 2004, Appuswami approached the High Court for inheritance to Thurlow's estate but expired while the matter was pending. His wife and children were brought on record. Subsequently, the society intervened, contending Appuswami did not have any right to the flat and it should be handed over to the Society. The Appuswami family continued to reside in the flat, and even pay the society's outgoings and maintenance charges. Later, the society stopped collecting maintenance charges from all members, as it earned...

Court approached in the early stages of arbitration will prevail in all other subsequent proceedings

In National Highway Authority of India v. Hindustan Steelworks Construction Limited, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court opined that once the parties have approached a certain court for relief under Act at earlier stages of disputes then it is same court that, parties must return to for all other subsequent proceedings. Language of Section 42 of Act is categorical and brooks no exception. In fact, the language used has the effect of jurisdiction of all courts since it states that once an application has been made in Part I of the Act then ―that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court. Court holds that NHAI in present case cannot take advantage of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for explaining inordinate delay in filing present petition under Section 34 of this Act in this Court.