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Inciting People On Social Media Might Also Amount To Attempting To Wage War Against The Government

In Arvinder Singh @ Ghoga vs State of Punjab, the Punjab & Haryana High Court was hearing an Application for regular bail filed under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. by Singh, a resident of Pallian Khurd in Nawanshahr, who was arrested in May, 2016. He had been charged inter alia with the offence under Section 121 (waging, or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war, against the Government of India) of the Indian Penal Code, along with provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967.

Singh had asserted that sharing of the alleged seditious/communally sensitive or hateful posts on social media does not disclose any ingredients to establish the offence under Section 121. He had further contended that the acts of receiving money from abroad or distributing Pamphlets or sending Booklets abroad meant to convey the objective of securing “purity” or “non-servility” of the ‘Sikh Panth’ cannot render him liable for offences under the UAPA as well.

The State, on the other hand, had contended that even collecting men, and not necessarily arms and ammunition, would amount to attempting to wage a war against the Government. It submitted that this would make an offence under Section 122 (collecting arms, etc., with intention of waging war against the Government of India) of the Code, which Singh can be convicted of if the material so indicates.

Refusing to grant bail to an alleged member of terror group Babbar Khalsa International, the Punjab and Haryana High Court observed that inciting people on social media on directly accessible all over the World simultaneously, and not just in a limited crowded place might also amount to mounting an attempt at waging war against the government.

It can therefore, be safely held that the Petitioner by way of collecting ‘men’, with the intention of either waging or being prepared to wage war against the Government of India, would be liable under section 122 of the IPC, which is punishable at par with section 121-A of IPC itself, for which he is already facing trial. The punishment in such event can extend to imprisonment for life.


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