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Once review petition is dismissed, only the main order can be challenged, not the order dismissing the review petition

In Ramvati Vs. Sukhbir Singh Chauhan and Ors., the High Court of Delhi referring to the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Yashwant Singh Negi held that, once the Court has refused to entertain the review petition and the same is dismissed, there is no question of any merger and the aggrieved person has to challenge the main order and not the order dismissing the review petition because to the dismissal of the review petition the principle of merger does not apply. Reference was made to DSR Steel (Private) Limited Vs. State of Rajasthan laying down that, when the review petition is dismissed, the order of which review was sought, suffers neither any reversal nor an alteration or modification and anyone aggrieved by the order of which review was sought shall have to challenge the same and not the order dismissing the review petition. Applying the said principles, the SLP preferred against the order of dismissal of review petition, without challenging the order of which review was sought, was held to be not maintainable and was dismissed. 

Even if a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was held to be maintainable, it would be maintainable on the well recognized grounds, of the Court having exercised jurisdiction which did not vest in it or having exercised jurisdiction with material irregularity and which is not found to be the case. It is not as if the learned Civil Judge has refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in her of review or has exercised the same with material irregularity. The view taken by the learned ADJ, of there being no error within the meaning of Order XL VII Rule 1 of the CPC in the order of which review was sought, is a well reasoned view in accordance with law. There is thus no merit in the petition which is dismissed.

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