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Eviction even after comprise not allowed where Rent Act applicable

In M/S Alagu Pharmacy vs N Magudeswari, the appellants doing business in the name and style of M/s Alagu Pharmacy claim to be tenants in the suit property owned by the respondent herein since 1998 and around 2012 a lease agreement was entered between extending/renewing the period of lease. The respondent had issued legal notices calling upon the appellants to vacate the suit property alleging inter alia that the lease agreement was a forged document. After hearing the appellants, an ad interim injunction was granted by the District Munsif, Coimbatore. Subsequently an eviction order was issued by the Rent Controller against a compromise deed presented wherein apparently a compromise has been entered into between the appellant and the respondent. The said deed which was resisted by the appellant before the appellate court claiming the same was signed by them under pressure from the respondents and the local police. The said court found favour with the appellants whence the respondents went to High Court which ordered in their favour,  the  appellants then finally reached Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court referring to various judgments including Ajad Singh v. Chatra and Others,  K.K. Chari v. R.M. Seshadr, Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass,  Kaushalya Devi v. Shri K.L. Bansal, Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal and  Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam, decided that the order passed by the appellate court was absolutely correct and did not call for any interference on part of the High Court. The common thread that runs through the aforesaid pronouncements of this Court is – in cases where protection under a Rent Act is available, no eviction can be ordered unless ground seeking eviction is made out, even if parties had entered into a compromise. Moreover, the invalidity on that count can even be raised in execution. In the present case, the order dated 28.03.2014 did not remotely note that any particular ground under the Rent Act was made out.

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