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Limitation Period To Set Aside Arbitral Award Begins From Date Of Disposal Of Application To Correct The Award

In M/S VED PRAKASH MITHAL AND SONS vs UNION OF INDIA, an Arbitral Award was delivered on 30.10.2015 and received by the respondent on 07.11.2015. An application to correct the said aforesaid Award was made by the respondent on 16.11.2015. A similar application to correct the Award was also made on behalf of the respondent on 20.11.2015. Both these applications were decided by the learned Arbitrator together and dismissed on 14.12.2015. 

On 11.03.2016, objections and application objecting to the Award was filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 by the respondent. The only question that arises is whether the aforesaid Section 34 application could be said to be within the time mentioned in Section 34(3) of the Act.

The learned Additional District Judge, by order dated 30.05.2017, found that the application was time-barred, reasoning that the application should have been made on and from the first date as, in fact, there was no correction made to the Award.

On appeal before the High Court, the learned Single Judge of the High Court, by his judgment dated 10.07.2017, reversed the order of the Additional District Judge stating that as the Section 33 application had been disposed of only on 14.12.2015, the period mentioned in Section 34(3) would start running only from then, in which case, the Section 34 application could be said to be within time.

The Supreme Court decided that the view of the Delhi High Court and but not the judgment of a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of Amit Suryakant Lunavat vs. Kotak Securities, Mumbai, which was relied upon by the petitioners was correct since the Section 34(3) specifically speaks of the date on which a request under Section 33 has been “disposed of” by the Arbitral Tribunal. The Supreme Court are also of the view that a “disposal” of the application can be either by allowing it or dismissing it.


Comments

  1. The concluding para in this article is wrong. The Supreme Court held that the view of Delhi HC is correct and view of Bombay HC to be not correct.

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