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Principle Of ‘Moulding Of Relief’ Can’t Be Invoked At Interlocutory Stage

In Samir Narain Bhojwani vs. Aurora Properties and Investments, in a dispute between relating to a property wherein several agreements have been signed between the parties and relief was sought on various grounds, the ingle judge of the high court, at an interlocutory stage of a suit, directed the defendant to hand over keys and possession of eight flats to the plaintiff along with 16 parking spaces, recording that he had moulded the reliefs originally sought by the plaintiff in the changed circumstances of the case and in order to shorten the litigation and do complete justice. The high court had relied on the judgment of the apex court in Gaiv Dinshaw Irani and Others vs. Tehmtan Irani and Others, holding that courts ought to mould the relief in accordance with the changed circumstances for trying the litigation or to do complete justice. The division bench upheld the single bench order. 

The apex court bench observed that in Gaiv Dinshaw Irani (supra), the court had moulded the relief in favour of the party to the proceedings to do substantial justice whilst finally disposing of the proceedings and did not do so at an interlocutory stage. The bench also said the invocation of principle of moulding of reliefs so also the exercise of power to grant mandatory order at an interlocutory stage, is manifestly wrong.

Referring to judgment in Dorab Cawasji Warden vs Coomi Sorab Warden, the bench said it is well established that an interim mandatory injunction is not a remedy that is easily granted. It is an order that is passed only in circumstances which are clear and the prima facie material clearly justify a finding that the status quo has been altered by one of the parties to the litigation and the interests of justice demanded that the status quo ante be restored by way of an interim mandatory injunction. (See Metro Marins and Another Versus Bonus Watch Co. (P) Ltd. and Others, Kishore Kumar Khaitan and Another Versus Praveen Kumar Singh and Purshottam Vishandas Raheja and Another Versus Shrichand Vishandas Raheja (Dead) through LRS. and Others). In the factual scenario in which mandatory order has been passed against the appellant, in our opinion, is in excess of jurisdiction. Such a drastic order at an interlocutory stage ought to be eschewed. It cannot be countenanced.

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