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Possession of property on date of dispossession must for claiming relief under Section 6 of Specific Relief Act

In Ramesh Chand Koiri vs Chandan Koiri, revision application was filed before the Calcutta High Court by the plaintiff against the order of dismissal of suit of specific relief by the trial court. 

The Trial court had dismissed the suit holding, inter alia, that Section 6 of the Specific Relief Actspeaks of recovery of possession not on the ground of title but on the basis of prior possession which the plaintiff had failed to prove.

The plaintiff as evidence had produced attested photo copy of the tenancy agreement dated January 25, 2006, some rent bill and FIR lodged before the local police station complaining of illegal dispossession.

The High Court agreeing with the trial court held that Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides a special and speedy remedy for particular kind of grievance to replace in possession a person who had been evicted, from the immovable property of which he had been in possession otherwise than by process of law. Therefore, possession of the plaintiff over the immovable property on the date of dispossession is the condition precedent to invoke the jurisdiction of Section 6 of the aforesaid Act. Investigation into the title favouring such possession is irrelevant in the proceeding of such nature.

The plaintiff at best can rely upon the said documents in a suit or proceeding to establish his right of tenancy over the suit property. The present suit being under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 investigation into such question is totally unnecessary and irrelevant.

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