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Employees Compensation and Doctrine of Notional Extension of employer's premises

In Supreme Court, CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 931 OF 201, LEELA BAI AND ANOTHER SEEMA CHOUHAN AND ANOTHER, the deceased was working as driver of a bus ferrying passengers from Indore to Burhanpur. The bus used to ferry passengers from Burhanpur at 6.30 am and reach Indore at 11 am. The return journey would commence from Indore at 3 pm and terminate at Burhanpur at 7.30 pm.

Because of the nature of the duty, the deceased would stay with the bus for twenty-four hours and would not come home for as long as a week.

On the fateful day, the deceased had returned to Burhanpur from Indore at 7.30 pm. He met with an accidental death while he was coming down the roof the bus after having his meal at about 8.30 pm.

The short question for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the death occurred during the course of, and arising out of the employment.

The Court noted at the outset that the Act is a welfare legislation and has to be interpreted in the facts of each case and the evidence available and that the facts of this case falls squarely within the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in General Manager, B.E.S.T. Undertaking, Bombay vs. Mrs. Agnes, (1964), wherein it was decided that The man’s work does not consist solely in the task which he is employed to perform. It includes also matters incidental to that task. Times during which meals are taken, moments during which the man is proceeding towards his work from one portion of his employers’ premises to another, and periods of rest may all be included.

The Supreme Court held that in the facts of the present case and the nature of evidence, there was a clear nexus between the accident and the employment to apply the doctrine of “notional extension” of the employer’s premises so as to include an area which the workman passes and repasses in going to and in leaving the actual place of work.

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