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NI Act: Burden of proof upon accused if signature on cheque is admitted

In CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 198 OF 2017, Amol @ Jolly Shrichand Kungwani,  vs The State of Maharashtra, while appealing before the High Court of Bombay, the accused submitted that evidence of complainant shows that he is doing money lending business. He has not produced any accounts book to show the loan transaction. Learned trial Court has wrongly recorded its finding that accused has not discharged his burden in respect of presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Therefore the complainant has submitted that the complainant has proved that cheque was issued by the accused.

The High Court referring to judgments in  K. Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and anr.,  Shanaz D'Souza Vs. Sheikh Ameer Saheeb and anr., Mahesh Chandaikar Vs. Dattaram S/o Tato Chandaikar and anr. and Nitin s/o Bapurao Mankar Vs. Vyankatesh Housing Agency, Nagpur. decided that the burden is to be discharged by the accused and not by the complainant.  There is no dispute about the signature on the bounced cheque. The complainant has proved that he had given Rs. 50,000/­ to the accused. The complainant also proved the acknowledgment in respect of receipt of Rs. 50,000/­. The acknowledgment on the letterhead of the accused is proved on record. Cheque was dishonoured. Complainant issued notice but said notice was not claimed by the accused. Necessary requirement is proved by the complainant. There is no merit in the revision, hence, it is liable to be dismissed.

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