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Student passing public examination cannot be denied admission into next higher class of his old school

In Panchu Gopal Mondal Vs. The State of West Bengal Education Department and Ors., W.P. 23637(W) of 2018 Decided On: 04.12.2018, the son of the writ petitioner has been denied admission in class XI in Mathurapur Arya Vidyapith (HS). It is to be noted that the son of the writ petitioner studied in the said school from class V to X and took his Madhyamik Pariksha, 2018 from the said school and successfully passed the said examination. For this the petitioners referred to judgments of Supreme Court in Principal, Cambridge School and Anr. Vs. Payal Gupta (Ms) and Ors. reported in (1995) 5 SCC 512 and Principal, Kendriya Vidyalaya & Ors. Vs. Sourabh Chaudhary & Ors. reported in 2009) 1 SCC 794.

The Calcutta High Court decided that it is clear from the documents annexed to the writ petition that the son of the writ petitioner had passed the Madhyamik Pariksha, 2018 and, accordingly, he was very much eligible to join class XI. The judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited above deal with this aspect directly. In Payal Gupta (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has specifically stated that the question of an admission test or the result in a particular class or school for purposes of admission would arise only if a student of one institution goes for admission in some other institution.  The question of an admission test or the result in a particular class or school for purposes of admission would arise only if a student of one institution goes for admission in some other institution. The question of admission test on the basis of result in a particular class will not be taken into account in the case of a student of the same school who passes the public examination. One can have no objection to a school laying down cut-off marks for selection of suitable stream/course for a student giving due regard to his/her aptitude as reflected from the Class X marks where there are more than one stream. But it would be quite unreasonable and unjust to throw out a student from the school because he failed to get the cut-off marks in the Class X examination. After all the school must share at least some responsibility for the poor performance of its student and should help him in trying to do better in the next higher class. The school may of course give him the stream/course that may appear to be most suitable for him on the basis of the prescribed cut-off marks.

In the present case, it would have been perfectly open to the appellants to offer admission to the boy, Saurabh Chaudhary in Class XI in streams/courses other than Science stream with Mathematics on the basis of the prescribed cut-off level of marks, had such courses been available in Central School No. 2, AFS, Tambaram. But this school has only Science stream with Mathematics for Classes XI and XII. The decision in Payal forbids the school from turning down a student because he/she failed to get the cut-off level of marks for admission to Class XI. As a result of this fortuitous circumstance the boy must get admission in Class XI in Central School No. 2, AFS, Tambaram in Science stream with Mathematics.

Needless to say, based on the above decision, the Calcutta High Court directed the respondent school to immediately grant admission to the son of the writ petitioner so that he can continue his studies in class XI and XII in the said school.

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