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Civil Court Has No Jurisdiction When There Is A Dispute As To Whether Suit Property Is Wakf Or Not

In CIVIL APPEAL NO. 92 OF 2019 before the Supreme Court, PUNJAB WAKF BOARD vs SHAM SINGH HARIKE, the original suit was filed by Punjab Wakf Board in civil court seeking injunction restraining the defendants. The defendants filed written statement challenging the maintainability of the suit and denying the title of the plaintiff. After the suit was transferred to the Wakf Tribunal, the defendants filed an application before the Tribunal for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the Civil Court alone had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. This application was dismissed by the Tribunal. The High Court, allowed the revision petition against this order, and held that since the 'tenant' was a non-muslim, the Wakf Tribunal had no jurisdiction in the matter and it was only the Civil Court which had the jurisdiction.

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the view of the High Court that right, title and interest of a non-Muslim to the Wakf in a property cannot be put in jeopardy is contrary to the statutory scheme as contained in Section 6 of the Wakf Act, 1995. The bench observed that the High Court had erroneously applied that portion of judgment of Ramesh Gobindram where it had noticed an earlier judgment in Board of Muslim Wakfs, Rajasthan v. Radha Kishan.

The court also referred to the judgment in Haryana Wakf Board vs. Mahesh Kumar, which had held that the question as to whether the suit property is a Wakf property is a question has to be decided by the Tribunal.

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