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Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Can Entertain Application U/s 14 SARFAESI Act

In KO Anto vs. State of Kerala, the Kerala High Court considered a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging Ernakulam ACJM's order under Section 14 of SARFAESI Act and appointment of an Advocate Commissioner to take delivery of the secured assets.

The High Court observed that there is a division bench judgment Muhammed Ashraf and Another v. Union of India and Others, 2008 (3) KHC 935, which has held that the powers of the Chief Judicial Magistrates in non metropolitan areas and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in metropolitan area are one and the same. Further, it was noted that in Shiyas v. Union of India [2019 (1) KLT 967] and Pouly @ Thressia and Another v. Union of India and Others [2019 (1) KHC 75], the High Court has repelled a similar challenge passed against order passed by ACJM. The court further observed that orders passed by ACJM do not suffer from any perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference in exercise of its supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

It should be noted here the  Supreme Court is still undecided on this issue and around the country, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras high courts have taken a view that the Chief Judicial Magistrate has no power to entertain applications filed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, whereas Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Allahabad high courts have taken a view that the Chief Judicial Magistrate can exercise the powers.


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