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Criminal Complaint Not Barred By Limitation Cannot Be Quashed On The Sole Ground Of Undue Delay

In Sindhu S.Panicker vs. A.Balakrishnan, the transaction alleged by the complainant was on 10.04.2007. The cheque allegedly given by the accused to the complainant is dated 16.05.2007. The complaint under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused was filed only on 29.03.2011.

On a petition filed by the accused before the Kerala High Court for quashing of the complaint on the ground of undue delay, the court observed that the general rule of criminal justice is that "a crime never dies". Mere delay in approaching a court of law would not by itself afford a ground for dismissing the case though it may be a relevant circumstance in reaching a final verdict (See Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty : AIR 2007 SC 2762). When no period of limitation is prescribed for filing the complaint, it cannot be thrown out on the sole ground of delay. The question of delay in filing a complaint may be a circumstance to be taken into consideration in arriving at the final decision. But, by itself, it affords no ground for dismissing the complaint. Prosecution should not be quashed on the ground that there was delay in instituting the complaint.
Inordinate and unexplained delay in filing a complaint regarding commission of an offence would certainly a factor to be taken into account by the court in taking the final decision in the case. But, when the complaint is not barred by limitation, it cannot be thrown out at the threshold, merely on the ground of undue delay.


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