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Date of filing of affidavit is not starting point from when workman would become entitled to receive last drawn full wages

In B N Singh v. M/s Hindustan Antibiotics Limited, before the Delhi High Court, the grievance of the Appellant, is that under Section 17B of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, he was entitled to payment of the last drawn wages from the date of institution of the writ proceedings by the Respondent in present Court to assail the industrial award in his favour, and merely because the affidavit in support of the application in terms of Section 17B was filed on 26th February, 2019, the date from which he was entitled to receive the last drawn wages was not postponed to the said date. He submits that, the learned Single Judge has wrongly read and interpreted the decision of the Supreme Court in Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation v. K.B. Singh. 

The High Court observed that a reading of Section 17B of Act shows that, when an award made by the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal directs reinstatement of any workman, and such an award is assailed before the High Court, or the Supreme Court by the employer, the workman is entitled to seek, during the pendency of such proceedings in the High Court, or the Supreme Court, the full wages last drawn by him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under the Rules. This is subject to the condition that, he should not have been employed in any establishment during such period. For this purpose, he is required to file an affidavit stating that, he had not been employed in any such establishment during the relevant period. 

It is clear from the plain reading of Section 17B of Act that, the period for which the workman can claim the last drawn wages commences from the date of filing of the proceedings challenging the industrial award before the High Court, or the Supreme Court, or as the case may be. The date of filing of the affidavit is not the starting point from when the workman would become entitled to receive the last drawn full wages. The filing of the affidavit is only a pre-condition to trigger the obligation of the employer to make payment of the last drawn wages from the date of filing of the petition in the Court, in terms of the order that the Court may pass after perusing the application and the affidavit. 

Even the Supreme Court has not stated in Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation v. K.B. Singh that, the entitlement for such wages would be from the respective dates “of” filing of the affidavits by the workman. The Supreme Court has cautiously used the words “their entitlement for such wages would be from the respective dates by filing affidavits by each of them in this Court in compliance with Section17-B of Act, 1947” This aspect has been missed by the learned Single Judge. 

The learned Single Judge has wrongly interpreted both Section 17B of Act, as well as the decision of the Supreme Court. Impugned order is set aside to the extent that it restricts the right of the Appellant to receive wages under Section 17B only from 26th February, 2019. The said wages would be payable from the date of filing of the writ petition, keeping in view the affidavit filed by him that, he has remained unemployed since the date of his termination.

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