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A person who has not suffered an invasion of his legal rights as a consumer cannot move CCI for violation of Competition law

In Samir Agrawal vs CCI, a person claiming to be an independent legal practitioner, filed Information with the Competition Commission of India alleging contravention of provisions of Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002 in as much as the cab aggregators viz Ola and Uber used their respective algorithmic to facilitate price fixing between drivers.

The allegation being rejected by the NCLT, appeal was filed before the NCLAT. The NCLAT while agreeing with the NCLT, further decided that this case merits looking into the the procedure governing inquiry by the Commission in allegations of anti-competitive agreements, including price fixation, cartelisation and abuse of dominant position. Section 19 of the Act provides for inquiry into certain agreements and dominant position of enterprise. The NCLAT observed that Under this Section, the Commission may inquire into any alleged contravention of the provisions contained in sub- section (1) of Section 3 or sub-section (1) of Section 4 through either of the following modes:-

(a) on its own motion; or
(b) on receipt of any information from any person, consumer or their association or trade association; or (c) a reference made to it by the Central Government or a State Government or a statutory authority

On a plain reading of this provision, it is abundantly clear that the Commission is empowered to take cognizance of any allegation of alleged contravention of the aforestated provisions of the Act on its own motion or on the basis of the complaint or on the basis of reference made to it by the appropriate Government or statutory authority. Information into allegations of alleged contravention of such provision may be filed by any person, consumer or their association or trade association. 

The question that arises for consideration is whether a ‘person’ would mean any natural person irrespective of he being a consumer who has suffered invasion of his legal rights or a person whose legal rights have been or are likely to be jeopardised by the alleged anti-competitive agreement or abuse of dominant position.

The NCLAT further held that it is true that the concept of locus standi has been diluted to some extent by allowing public interest litigation, class action and actions initiated at the hands of consumer and trade associations. Even the whistle blowers have been clothed with the right to seek redressal of grievances affecting public interest byenacting a proper legal framework. However, the fact remains that when a statute like the Competition Act specifically provides for the mode of taking cognizance of allegations regarding contravention of provisions relating to certain anti-competitive agreement and abuse of dominant position by an enterprise in a particular manner and at the instance of a person apart from other modes viz. suo motu or upon a reference from the competitive government or authority, reference to receipt of any information from any person in section 19(1) (a) of the Act has necessarily to be construed as a reference to a person who has suffered invasion of his legal rights as a consumer or beneficiary of healthy competitive practices. Any other interpretation would make room for unscrupulous people to rake issues of anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominant position targeting some enterprises with oblique motives. In the instant case, the Informant claims to be an Independent Law-Practitioner. There is nothing on the record to show that he has suffered a legal injury at the hands of Ola and Uber as a consumer or as a member of any consumer or trade association. Not even a solitary events of the Informant of being a victim of unfair price fixation mechanism at the hands of Ola and Uber or having suffered on account of abuse of dominant position of either of the two enterprises have been brought to the notice of this Appellate Tribunal. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the Informant has no locus standi to maintain an action qua the alleged contravention of Act.




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