Skip to main content

Can an ex-employee of the Financial Creditor be permitted to act as Resolution Professional?

In State Bank of India vs M/s. Metenere Ltd., appeal was filed before the NCLAT against the order of the NCLT wherein the NCLT had upheld the objection raised by the ‘Corporate Debtor’- ‘M/s. Metenere Limited’ regarding the name of proposed ‘Interim Resolution Professional’- Mr. Shailesh Verma. The Corporate Debtor had objected to the said appointment apprehending bias as Mr. Verma had worked with the State Bank of India - the Financial Creditor for 39 years before his retirement in 2016 and is currently drawing pension from SBI.

The NCLAT decided that the sole question arising for determination in this appeal is whether an ex-employee of the ‘Financial Creditor’ having rendered services in the past, should not be permitted to act as ‘Interim Resolution Professional’ at the instance of such ‘Financial Creditor’, regard being had to the nature of duties to be performed by the ‘Interim Resolution Professional’ and the ‘Resolution Professional’.

The NCLAT observed that just being an ex- employee drawing pension for services rendered in past does not clothe him with the status of an ‘interested person’. The fact that Mr. Shailesh Verma is drawing pension from ‘Financial Creditor’s organisation does not clothe him with the status of an employee on the payroll of ‘Financial Creditor’. Pension is paid for the services rendered to the employer in the past and it is a benefit earned for such past services under the relevant Service Rules. The pensioner is entitled to such benefit as a privilege under the Service Rules and not as a boon from the ex-employer. Referring to Regulation 3 (1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016, the NCLAT held that the Regulation clearly provides that an Insolvency Professional shall be eligible for appointment as a ‘Resolution Professional’ for the ‘Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process’ of a ‘Corporate Debtor’ if he or his partners and directors of the Insolvency Professional Entity are independent of the ‘Corporate Debtor’. Admittedly, Mr. Shailesh Verma is a qualified Insolvency Professional and neither he nor any of his associates is alleged to be connected with the ‘Corporate Debtor’ in a manner rendering him ineligible to act as a ‘Resolution Professional’. Provision engrafted in Section 17(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 bringing pension within the ambit of ‘salary’ cannot be interpreted to render a pensioner of a ‘Financial Creditor’ under the statutory framework ineligible as an ‘interested person’ being in employment of the ‘Financial Creditor’ as the definition of ‘salary’ under the Income Tax Act, 1961 is designed only for the purposes of computing of income to determine tax liability. The argument advanced on behalf of the Corporate Debtor’ in this Court to portray Mr. Shailesh Verma as an ‘interested person’ drawing salary within the meaning of Income Tax Act, 1961 defies logic and same has to be repelled.

“State Bank of India v. Ram Dev International Ltd. (Through Resolution Professional)− Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 302 of 2018” decided on 16th July, 2018, this Appellate Tribunal observed that merely because a ‘Resolution Professional’ is empanelled as an Advocate or Company Secretary or Chartered Accountant with the ‘Financial Creditor’ cannot be a ground to reject the proposal of his appointment unless there is any disciplinary proceeding pending against him or it is shown that the person is an interested person being an employee or on the payroll of the ‘Financial Creditor’. Admittedly, no disciplinary proceedings are pending against Mr. Shailesh Verma and he is not on aforestated panel or engaged as a retainer by the ‘Financial Creditor’. He had a long relationship with the ‘Financial Creditor’, spanning around four decades, before demitting office as the Chief General Manger in 2016 but currently he is merely a pensioner drawing pension as a benefit earned for the past services in terms of the relevant Service Rules which he is getting independent of the benevolence of the ex-employer i.e. the Appellant- ‘Financial Creditor’. But it cannot be denied that the Appellant restricted its choice to propose Mr. Shailesh Verma as ‘Interim Resolution Professional’ obviously having regard to past loyalty and the long services rendered by the later. This conclusion is further reinforced by filing of instant appeal by the ‘Financial Creditor’ who is upset with the impugned order directing the Appellant- ‘Financial Creditor’ to substitute the name of ‘Interim Resolution Professional’ in place of Mr. Shailesh Verma. This has to be viewed in the context of apprehension of bias raised by the Respondent- ‘Corporate Debtor’ for the apprehension of bias necessarily rests on the perception of Respondent- ‘Corporate Debtor’. 

It is profitable to refer to the following observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in “Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and Ors.− (1987) 4 SCC 611”: As to the tests of the likelihood of bias what is relevant is the reasonableness of the apprehension in that regard in the mind of the party. The proper approach for the judge is not to look at his own mind and ask himself, however, honestly, “Am I Biased?”; but to look at the mind of the party before him”

8. The fact that the proposed ‘Resolution Professional’ Mr. Shailesh Verma had a long association of around four decades with the ‘Financial Creditor’ serving under it and currently drawing pension coupled with the fact that the ‘Interim Resolution Professional’ is supposed to collate all the claims submitted by Creditors, though not empowered to determine the claims besides other duties as embedded in Section 18 of the ‘I&B Code’ raised an apprehension in the mind of Respondent- ‘Corporate Debtor’ that Mr. Shailesh Verma as the proposed ‘Interim Resolution Professional’ was unlikely to act fairly justifying the action of the Adjudicating Authority in passing the impugned order to substitute him by another Insolvency Professional. Observations of the Adjudicating Authority in the impugned order with regard to ‘Interim Resolution Professional’ to act as an Independent Umpire must be understood in the context of the ‘Interim Resolution Professional’ acting fairly qua the discharge of his statutory duties irrespective of the fact that he is not competent to admit or reject a claim.

In the given set of circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the apprehension of bias expressed by the ‘Corporate Debtor’ qua the appointment of Mr. Shailesh Verma as proposed ‘Interim Resolution Professional’ at the instance of the Appellant- ‘Financial Creditor’ cannot be dismissed offhand and the Adjudicating Authority was perfectly justified in seeking substitution of Mr. Shailesh Verma to ensure that the ‘Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process’ was conducted in a fair and unbiased manner. This is notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Shailesh Verma was not disqualified or ineligible to act as an ‘Interim Resolution Professional’. Viewed thus, we find no legal flaw in the impugned order which is free from any legal infirmity and has to be upheld. It goes without saying that the Appellant- ‘Financial Creditor’ should not have been aggrieved of the impugned order as the same did not cause any prejudice to it.

Note:

Therefore while the law has no problem with appointment of an ex-employee as IRP, it appears that issue of bias can always be raised and the NCLAT appears to have accepted the allegation of bias only on the ground that the Financial Creditor tried to defend the appointment. The rational behind the order is not very clear.

Comments

Most viewed this month

One Sided Clauses In Builder-Buyer Agreements Is An Unfair Trade Practice

In CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12238 OF 2018, Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. vs Govindan Raghavan, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court  by the builder against the order of the National Consumer Forum. The builder had relied upon various clauses of the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement to refute the claim of the respondent but was rejected by the commission which found the said clauses as wholly one-sided, unfair and unreasonable, and could not be relied upon. The Supreme Court on perusal of the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement found stark incongruities between the remedies available to both the parties. For example, Clause 6.4 (ii) of the Agreement entitles the Appellant – Builder to charge Interest @18% p.a. on account of any delay in payment of installments from the Respondent – Flat Purchaser. Clause 6.4 (iii) of the Agreement entitles the Appellant – Builder to cancel the allotment and terminate the Agreement, if any installment remains in arrears for more than 30 da...

Inherited property of childless hindu woman devolve onto heirs of her parents

In Tarabai Dagdu Nitanware vs Narayan Keru Nitanware, quashing an order passed by a joint civil judge junior division, Pune, the Bombay High Court has held that under Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother, will devolve upon the heirs of her father/mother, if she dies without any children of her own, and not upon her husband. Justice Shalini Phansalkar Joshi was hearing a writ petition filed by relatives of one Sundarabai, who died issueless more than 45 years ago on June 18, 1962. Article referred:http://www.livelaw.in/property-inherited-female-hindu-parents-shall-devolve-upon-heirs-father-not-husband-dies-childless-bombay-hc-read-judgment/

Court approached in the early stages of arbitration will prevail in all other subsequent proceedings

In National Highway Authority of India v. Hindustan Steelworks Construction Limited, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court opined that once the parties have approached a certain court for relief under Act at earlier stages of disputes then it is same court that, parties must return to for all other subsequent proceedings. Language of Section 42 of Act is categorical and brooks no exception. In fact, the language used has the effect of jurisdiction of all courts since it states that once an application has been made in Part I of the Act then ―that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court. Court holds that NHAI in present case cannot take advantage of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for explaining inordinate delay in filing present petition under Section 34 of this Act in this Court.