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Pleas Of Title And Adverse Possession Cannot Be Advanced Simultaneously And From The Same Date

In NARASAMMA & ORS. vs A. KRISHNAPPA, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against the judgment of the High Court, which in turn had reversed the order of the trial court in a matter of title and possession of a property.

The trial court had rejected the appellants plea of title but accepted the plea of adverse possession but the same was in turn rejected by the High Court. Hence the appeal.

The Supreme Court observed that the appellants herein have sought to take a plea of bar of limitation vis-à-vis the original defendant claiming that possession came to them in 1976, with the suit being filed in 1989. Yet at the same time, it is claimed that the wife had title on the basis of these very documents. 

The Supreme Court decided that whether simultaneously a plea can be taken of title and adverse possession, i.e., whether it would amount to taking contradictory pleas.

The Supreme Court agreeing with the respondents referred to four judgments of the Supreme Court :-

i) Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India& Ors.

ii) Mohan Lal (Deceased) Thr. LRs. v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar & Anr

iii) P.T. Munichikkamma Reddy & Ors. v. Revamma& Ors.

iv) M. Siddiq (Dead) Through LRs (Ram Janmabhumi Temple Case) v. Mahant Suresh Das& Ors.

The Supreme Court decided that in order to establish adverse possession an inquiry is required to be made into the starting point of such adverse possession and, thus, when the recorded owner got dispossessed would be crucial which has not been made out in this matter.


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