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Advanced payment for supply of goods is not Operational Debt

 IN THE MATTER OF Smt. Andal Bonumalla vs Tomato Trading LLP., the primary question raised in the appeal before NCLAT against the order of the NCLT was whether an advance amount for supply of goods can be considered as an Operational Debt under Section 5(20) of the I&B Code?

The NCLAT observed that this is admitted fact that the Corporate Debtor has agreed to deliver 130 Matric Tons of Sugar to the Operational Creditor, for the same, the Operational Creditor paid an advance amount total Rs. 34,90,180/- to Corporate Debtor and Corporate Debtor has issued Proforma Invoice dated 08.02.2017. The Corporate Debtor refunded Rs. 9 Lakhs only, balance principal amount of Rs. 25,90,180/- and interest Rs. 4,92,634/- total as on 07.03.2018 a sum of Rs. 30,82,814/- is due from the Corporate Debtor. We have considered whether this amount is come within the definition of Operational Debt under Section 5 (21) of I&B Code. The Respondent No. 1 has not supplied any goods or provided any services to Respondent No. 2, but paid an advance amount to Respondent No. 2 for supplying Sugar. However, the Respondent No. 2 failed to supply the Sugar to Respondent No. 1. Thus, the advance amount in the hand of Respondent No. 2 cannot termed as Operational Debt. Consequently, the Respondent No. 1 does not come within the definition under Section 5(20) of I&B Code, the Operational Creditor.

Allowing the appeal, the NCLAT held that advanced payment to Respondent (Operational Creditor) for supply of goods cannot be treated to be an Operational Debt and the Application under Section 9 of I&B Code, was not maintainable. The advance amount paid by the Respondent No. 1 to Respondent No. 2 for supply of Sugar is not an Operational Debt. Learned Adjudicating Authority erroneously admitted the Application. Thus, the Appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated is set aside.

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