In SRI V.N.KRISHNA MURTHY vs SRI RAVIKUMAR & ORS, a property was sold by the recorded owner of the land in dispute to a society and a general power of attorney was also signed by the sellers in favour of the office bearers of the society. On the strength of General Power of Attorney, sale deeds in respect of land in dispute was executed by the Attorneys in favour of appellants on various dates.
Suits were filed on the allegations that suit property is ancestral property and the plaintiffs were co-owner and thus defendant had no right to execute the agreement of sale ignoring the interest of the plaintiff. It was also pleaded that since the agreement of sale did not culminate into a sale transaction, the same are barred by law of limitation and are thus unenforceable.
The Trial Court passed decree in favour of the said plaintiffs. However the sale deeds executed in favour of appellants herein by the attorneys of the recorded land holder were not questioned in the suit and were neither subject matter of dispute therein nor any relief was claimed in their respect.
During the pendency of the suit proceedings, the appellants who were the final buyers, made an application under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) CPC for impleadment which was dismissed by the Trial Court. The appeal to the High Court failed also.
Before the Supreme Court, the appellants (final buyers) argued that the interest of the appellants is directly involved in the subject matter of the suit. They have become absolute owners of the sites in question on the basis of sale deeds. The judgment of the Trial Court holding the sale agreements time barred and granting a decree of permanent injunction actually affects their interests as they are in possession of the suit property.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently contended that the claim of the appellants herein is based on the sale deeds executed on the strength of the General Power of Attorney executed by the recorded owners of the suit property. There is neither any reference of the sale deeds in the suit nor the sale deeds refer to any agreement to sell. Therefore, the relief claimed, if any, by the appellants based on sale deeds in their favour is entirely different, and there is no locus to challenge the decree passed by the Trial Court and their application for leave to appeal has rightly been dismissed.
The Supreme Court while referring Smt. Jatan Kumar Golcha Vs. Golcha Properties Private Ltd., State of Punjab & Ors. Vs. Amar Singh & Anr., and Baldev Singh Vs. Surinder Mohan Sharma and Ors. & A. Subash Babu Vs. State of A.P. and Anr., observed that Section 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide for preferring annappeal from any original decree or from decree in appeal respectively. The aforesaid provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who can file an appeal.
However, it is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to file an appeal in any proceedings unless he satisfies the Court that he falls with the category of aggrieved persons. It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affects a person who is not party to the proceedings, he can prefer an appeal with the leave of the Appellate Court.
Referring to judgments in Shanti Kumar R. Canji Vs. Home Insurance Co. of New York and State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors and Srimathi K. Ponnalagu Ammani Vs. The State Of Madras, the Supreme Court held that the expression ‘person aggrieved’ does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must, therefore, necessarily be one, whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardized and it would be improper to grant leave to appeal to every person who may in some remote or indirect way be prejudicially affected by a decree or judgment. We think that ordinarily leave to appeal should be granted to persons who, though not parties to the proceedings, would be bound by the decree or judgment in that proceeding and who would be precluded from attacking its correctness in other proceedings.
Applying the above tests, the Supreme Court held that appellants can neither be said to be aggrieved persons nor bound by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court in any manner. The relief claimed in the suit was cancellation of agreement to sell. On the other hand, the sale deeds which were the basis of the claim of the appellants were executed on the basis of General Power of Attorney, and had nothing to do with the agreement to sell which was subject matter of suit. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court is in no sense a judgment in rem and it is binding only as between the plaintiffs and defendants of the suit, and not upon the appellants. The appellants have failed to place any material or demonstrate as to how the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court adversely or prejudicially affects them. Mere saying that the appellants are prejudicially affected by the decree is not sufficient. It has to be demonstrated that the decree affects the legal rights of the appellants and would have adverse effect when carried out. Facts of the case clearly demonstrate that suit which has been decreed is confined only to a declaration sought in respect of an agreement to sell. Injunction was also sought only against the defendant- society or its officers or assigns. There is not even a whisper in the entire plaint or in suit proceedings about the sale deed executed in favour of the appellants by the General Power of Attorney holders or even for that matter in the judgment and decree of the Trial Court.
The Supreme Court decided that the appellants have thus failed to demonstrate that they are prejudicially or adversely affected by the decree in question or any of their legal rights stands jeopardized so as to bring them within the ambit of the expression ‘person aggrieved’ entitling them to maintain appeal against the decree.
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