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Evidence of general attorney is acceptable, where the affairs of a party are looked after by an attorney or a close family member

In Prem Vs. Maninder Kaur Kwatra, an ejectment application was filed by the respondent-landlady seeking eviction of the petitioner-tenant from the demised premises on the grounds that he had failed to pay or tender the rent for the demised premises since January 2016 and further that the respondent-landlady bonafidely required the demised premises for her own personal use and occupation and that the respondent-landlady or her son were not occupying any other such building in the urban area of SAS Nagar and had also not vacated any such building without sufficient cause after the commencement of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 in the urban area of Mohali.

The ejectment application was contested by the petitioner-tenant contending that the same had been filed to cause harassment and financial loss to the petitioner-tenant by dragging him in unwanted litigation on the basis of false allegations merely to increase the rent of the demised premises.

Preet Inder Singh, son of the respondent-landlady, being her GPA holder, stepped into the witness box as PW1 while the petitioner-tenant himself stepped into the witness box as RW1.

The Rent Controller, while allowing the ejectment application, rejected the argument raised by the petitioner-tenant that since the respondent-landlady had failed to step into the witness box to prove the contents of the ejectment application and, therefore, the evidence led on her behalf by way of affidavit of her son, being her General Attorney, could not be looked into. The Rent Controller held that, admittedly, not only was the rent being paid to the son of the respondent-landlady but further that the son of the respondent-landlady, who appeared as GPA holder of the respondent-landlady, was well conversant with the facts of the present case and, therefore, was competent to depose. Appeal filed by the petitioner-tenant before the Appellate Authority was also dismissed.

Before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, while challenging the order of the Appellate Authority the only ground objection raised by the petitioner-tenant was that the respondent-landlady did not step into the witness-box to testify as to her personal bona fide necessity and thus the testimony of her son PW1, Preet Inder Singh, who appeared in the witness box as her General Attorney, was not admissible in evidence regarding matters of her personal knowledge. 

The High Court dismissing the petition observed that it is by now well settled that a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant from the tenanted premises not only for his or her need but even for the need of a closely related person. In the present case the eviction petition was filed by the respondent-landlady pleading the bona fide need of the demised premises for her son to start his business. Such an eviction petition was clearly maintainable by the respondent-landlady under the provisions of the Act. Further, as per law settled by the Apex Court in 'Man Kaur (Dead) through LRs vs. Hartar Singh Sangha', MANU/SC/0789/2010 : 2011(1) RCR (Civil) 189, where a landlord seeks eviction of his tenant on the ground of his bona fide need, normally the landlord himself has to give evidence and not an attorney. However, there is an exception to the aforesaid requirement i.e. where the affairs of a party are managed, transacted and looked after by an attorney and such attorney happens to be a close family member, it would certainly be possible to accept the evidence of such attorney. Adverting to the facts of the present case, the ejectment application had been filed under Section 13 of the Act seeking eviction of the tenant-petitioner specifically raising a plea that the same is required by the respondent-landlady for her son to start his business, after raising some construction. The General Attorney of the respondent-landlady who deposed in support of the averments made in the ejectment application is none other but this very son of her's. Thus, the son of the respondent-landlady could definitely depose in support of the averments made in the ejectment application without the respondent-landlady stepping into the witness box. Similar view has been taken in 'Shere Punjab Trading Co. & Anr. vs. Smt. Uma Rani Mohindru', MANU/PH/1209/2019 : 2019(2) RCR (Rent) 102; 'M/s. Hind Sons Agency & Ors. vs. Sh. Jai Parkash Jain', MANU/PH/3703/2011 : 2012(1) RCR (Rent) 92; and 'Chuni Lal Chaudhary vs. Rakesh Bakshi', MANU/PH/0554/2017 : 2017(1) RCR (Rent) 516. Thus, merely because the respondent-landlady has not appeared as a witness in the case and her General Attorney appeared, which General Attorney was none other than her own son, is no ground to non-suit the respondent-landlady. There is, thus, no merit in the sole contention argued by the counsel for the petitioner-tenant.

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