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Not necessary to implead a Sole-proprietary concern for cheque bouncing

In Dhirendra Singh v. State of U.P, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Allahabad High Court to set aside the summon issued by the Ld. Trial Court. It had been alleged that the petitioner had taken a loan and the cheques issued by the petitioner against the same had bounced/dishonoured due to insufficiency of   funds. The primary objection of the petitioner was that the complainant / respondent was wholly incompetent to lodge the prosecution as cheques were issued by the firm M/s Rashmi Arosole & Chemicals and petitioner is proprietor of this firm but the firm is not arraign as an accused.

Dismissing the petition, the High Court observed that a plain reading of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act makes it clear, if the person committing the offence is a "company", in that event every natural person responsible for such commission as also the artificial person namely the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Also, certain other natural persons may be held guilty, if so proved. 
The Appellant Dhirendra Singh, is the proprietor of the firm namely M/S Rashmi Arosole & Chemical which is a sole proprietorship firm. Thus, the main question arises whether in sole proprietorship firm indictment of firm arraign as parties is necessary or not. 
The phrase "association of individuals" necessarily requires such entity to be constituted by two or more individuals i.e. natural persons. On the contrary a sole-proprietorship concern, by very description does not allow for ownership to be shared or be joint and it defines, restricts and dictates the ownership to remain with one person only. Thus, "associations of individuals" are absolutely opposed to sole-proprietorship concerns, in that sense and aspect. 
A 'partnership' on the other hand is a relationship formed between persons who willfully form such relationship with each other. Individually, in the context of that relationship, they are called 'partners' and collectively, they are called the 'firm', while the name in which they set up and conduct their business/activity (under such relationship), is called their 'firm name'. 
While a partnership results in the collective identity of a firm coming into existence, a proprietorship is nothing more than a cloak or a trade name acquired by an individual or a person for the purpose of conducting a particular activity. With or without such trade name, it (sole proprietary concern) remains identified to the individual who owns it. It does not bring to life any new or other legal identity or entity. No rights or liabilities arise or are incurred, by any person (whether natural or artificial), except that otherwise attach to the natural person who owns it. Thus it is only a 'concern' of the individual who owns it. The trade name remains the shadow of the natural person or a mere projection or an identity that springs from and vanishes with the individual. It has no independent existence or continuity. 
In the context of an offence under section 138 of the Act, by virtue of Explanation (b) to section 141 of the Act, only a partner of a 'firm' has been artificially equated to a 'director' of a 'company'. Its a legal fiction created in a penal statute. It must be confined to the limited to the purpose for which it has been created. Thus a partner of a 'firm' entails the same vicarious liability towards his 'firm' as 'director' does towards his 'company', though a partnership is not an artificial person. So also, upon being thus equated, the partnership 'firm' and its partner/s has/have to be impleaded as an accused person in any criminal complaint, that may be filed alleging offence committed by the firm. However, there is no indication in the statute to stretch that legal fiction to a sole proprietary concern. 
Besides, in the case of a sole proprietary concern, there are no two persons in existence. Therefore, no vicarious liability may ever arise on any other person. The identity of the sole proprietor and that of his 'concern' remain one, even though the sole proprietor may adopt a trade name different from his own, for such 'concern'. Thus, even otherwise, conceptually, the principle contained in section 141 of the Act is not applicable to a sole-proprietary concern. 
Accordingly, there is no defect in the complaint lodged against the applicant, in his capacity as the sole proprietor of the concern M/s Rashmi Arosole & Chemicals. There was no requirement to implead his sole proprietary concern as an accused person nor there was any need to additionally implead the applicant by his trade name. 
On perusal of the averment of the parties, it is crystal clear that petitioner taken the money in advance by way of loan and petitioner handed over the cheques bearing no. 850213 & 850214 amount of Rs. 50,000/- each only for the security for payment of money advance by way of loan. So the transaction of money and cheques not in the prosecution of business of firm but cheques handed over by petitioner to Nepal Singh in individual capacity. So due to aforesaid reason too no need to implead the sole proprietor firm by his firm name. 

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