Skip to main content

Limitation for challenging arbitral award can only commence from date of receipt of signed copy

In DAKSHIN HARYANA BIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LTD. vs M/S NAVIGANT TECHNOLOGIES PVT. LTD., the issue which has arisen for our consideration is as to whether the period of limitation for filing the Petition under Section 34 would commence from the date on which the draft award dated 27.04.2018 was circulated to the parties, or the date on which the signed copy of the award was provided.

The arbitral tribunal orally pronounced the award [2:1] on 27.04.2018, whereby the claims of the respondent company were allowed. The parties were informed that the third arbitrator had disagreed with the view taken by the majority of arbitrators, and would be rendering his separate opinion. A copy of the draft award was provided to the parties to point out any computation, clerical or typographical errors in the award on the next date of hearing. On 12.05.2018, a copy of the dissenting opinion was provided by the third arbitrator to the parties (even though the opinion was dated 27.04.2018). The matter was then posted to 19.05.2018, for the parties to point out any typographical or clerical mistakes in the dissenting opinion delivered by the third arbitrator. On 19.05.2018, the tribunal recorded that both the parties had not filed any application to point out any clerical or typographical mistakes in the award, or dissenting opinion. On this date, the signed copy of the arbitral award was provided to both the parties, and the proceedings were terminated.

The Appellant-corporation filed its Objections under Section 34 on 10.09.2018 before the Ld. Civil Court, Hisar, Haryana to challenge the award dated 27.04.2018, along with an Application for condonation of delay. It was submitted by the appellant corporation that the objections were filed within the period prescribed by Section 34(3) i.e. within 3 months and 30 days from the date of receipt of the signed award on 12.05.2018.

The Civil Court dismissed the Application for condonation of delay. It was held that the Appellant had received the majority award on 27.04.2018. Thus, the period of limitation starts running from the same date. Accordingly, the period of limitation of three months starts from 27.04.2018 i.e. the date on which the Appellant received the arbitral award. The proviso to Section 34(3) provides that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented from sufficient cause from making the application within 3 months, it may entertain the application within a further period of 30 days. In the present case, the application u/S. 34 was filed even after the expiry of the further period of 30 days. Merely because the dissenting opinion was erroneously styled as an award by the minority arbitrator, it cannot be said that the dissenting opinion attains the status of an award. Consequently, the objections were dismissed solely on the ground of delay.

The appellant corporation filed Appeal No. 1954/2019 (O&M) under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act before the High Court. 

The High Court vide the impugned Order dated 11.12.2019 affirmed the Order passed by the Civil Court. It was held that a reading of Section 31 clearly reflects that once an award is signed and communicated by the majority of arbitrators, the same would constitute an “award”. The signed copy of the majority award i.e. signed by two of the three arbitrators was received on 27.04.2018, and u/S. 34(3), the objections had to be filed within 3 months, which would expire on 27.07.2018. Even if the benefit of 30 days had been granted to the Appellants, the objections ought to have been filed by 26.08.2018, whereas the objections had been filed on 10.09.2018. There was no infirmity in the judgment of the Civil Court, and accordingly, the Appeal was dismissed.

In this matter the Supreme Court observed that even though the arbitral award was pronounced on 27.04.2018, the signed copy of the award was provided to the parties only on 19.05.2018. The procedural orders of the tribunal reveal that on 27.04.2018, only a copy of the award was provided to the parties to point out any computation error, any clerical or typographical error, or any other error of similar nature which may have occurred in the award on the next date. It was also recorded that the third arbitrator had dissented, and would be delivering his separate opinion. The proceedings were then posted for 12.05.2018.On 12.05.2018, the third arbitrator pronounced his dissenting opinion. On that date, the tribunal posted the matter to 19.05.2018, to enable the parties to point out any typographical or clerical mistakes in the dissenting opinion, and for handing over the original record of the proceedings to the parties. On 19.05.2018, the signed copy of the award and the dissenting opinion, alongwith the original record, were handed over to the parties, as also to each of the arbitrators. The tribunal ordered the termination of the proceedings.

On appeal, the Supreme Court referred to Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors7, where a three-judge bench  held that the period of limitation for filing an application u/S. 34 would commence only after a valid delivery of the award takes place u/S. 31(5) of the Act.

Applying the law to the facts of the present case, the court was of the considered opinion that the period of limitation for filing objections would have to be reckoned from the date on which the signed copy of the award was made available to the parties i.e. on 19.05.2018 in the instant case.

It is the admitted position that the objections were filed within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 34(3) of the Act, if reckoned from 19.05.2018. Undisputedly, in the instant case, the objections have been filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) from the date of receipt of the signed award.

Comments

Most viewed this month

Appellate authorities under Special Statutes cannot be asked to condone delay

Madras High Court in R.Gowrishankar vs. The Commissioner of Service Tax has held that Appellate authorities cannot be asked to condone the delay, beyond the extended period of limitation A Division Bench comprising of Justices S. Manikumar and D. Krishnakumar, made this observation while considering an appeal filed against Single Bench order declining to set aside the order made in the condone delay petition filed by the petitioner to condone 223 days in filing the appeal before the Commissioner of Service Tax (Appeals). Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/appellate-authorities-special-statutes-cannot-asked-condone-delay-beyond-extended-period-limitation-madras-hc/

'Seize assets to pay damages to accident victim'

Her story might be an inspiration for the physically challenged but justice has remained elusive for her. In 2008, a bus accident left research engineer S Thenmozhi, 30, paraplegic. In April 2013, the motor accident claims tribunal directed the Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (TNSTC) to provide her a compensation of 57.9 lakh. However, TNSTC refused to budge and on Tuesday a city court ordered attaching of movable assets of the transport corporation. Thenmozhi was employed in C-DOT, a telecom technology development centre in Bangalore. On July 21, 2008, she was coming to Chennai in a private bus. Around 2am, the bus had a flat tyre and the driver parked it on the left side of the road near Pallikonda in Vellore district on the Bangalore-Chennai highway. While the tyre was being changed, a TNSTC bus of Dharmapuri division hit the stationary bus. The rear part of the bus was smashed and passengers were injured. Thenmozhi who had a seat at the back of the bus suffered...

Mumbai ITAT rules income of offshore discretionary trust is subject to tax in India

The Mumbai Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) has recently determined the following issue in the affirmative in the case of Manoj Dhupelia: Should the income of an offshore discretionary trust be subject to tax in India, if no distributions have been made to beneficiaries in India? The question arose from appeals filed by individual beneficiaries in relation to a Lichtenstein-based trust, the Ambrunova Trust and Merlyn Management SA (the Trust) with the ITAT. It is important to note that the individuals in this case were amongst those first identified by the Government of India (GOI) as holding undeclared bank accounts in Lichtenstein. The ITAT ruling raises the following issues: Taxation of Trust Corpus: ITAT classified the corpus of the trust as "undisclosed income" and declared it taxable in the hands of the beneficiaries. Taxation of Undistributed Income: ITAT refused to draw a distinction between the corpus and undistributed income from the trust and declared i...