Skip to main content

Maximum time provided for filing response under Section 13 of Consumer Protection Act is 45 days

In New India Assurance v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., reference was made before the 5 judge bench of the Supreme Court relating to the grant of time for filing response to a complaint under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 wherein the answers to the following questions were sought:

1) whether Section 13(2) (a) of the Consumer Protection Act, which provides for the respondent/opposite party filing its response to the complaint within 30 days or such extended period, not exceeding 15 days, should be read as mandatory or directory; i.e., whether the District Forum has power to extend the time for filing the response beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days.

2) what would be the commencing point of limitation of 30 days stipulated under the aforesaid Section.

Answering the first question,  the Court held that the decision rendered by a 3-judge bench in Dr. J. J. Merchant v. Shrinath Chaturvedi, (2002) 6 SCC 635, to be correct in law, wherein it was held that the time limit prescribed for filing the response to the complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, as provided under Section 13(2)(a), is to be strictly adhered to, i.e. the same is mandatory, and not directory.

Answering the second question, the bench explained that a conjoint reading of Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-Section (2) of Section 13 would make the position absolutely clear that the commencing point of limitation of 30 days, under the aforesaid provisions, would be from the date of receipt of notice accompanied by a copy of the complaint, and not merely receipt of the notice, as the response has to be given, within the stipulated time, to the averments made in the complaint and unless a copy of the complaint is served on the opposite party, he would not be in a position to furnish its reply. Thus, mere service of notice, without service of the copy of the complaint, would not suffice and cannot be the commencing point of 30 days under the aforesaid Section of the Act.

Comments

Most viewed this month

The recovery of vehicles by the financier not an offence - SC

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 8907  of 2009 Anup Sarmah (Petitioner) Vs Bhola Nath Sharma & Ors.(Respondents) The petitioner submitted that  respondents-financer had forcibly taken away the vehicle financed by them and  illegally deprived the petitioner from its lawful possession  and  thus,  committed  a crime. The complaint filed by the petitioner had been  entertained  by  the Judicial Magistrate (Ist Class), Gauhati (Assam) in Complaint Case  No.  608 of 2009, even directing the interim custody of the vehicle (Maruti  Zen)  be given to the petitioner vide order dated  17.3.2009.  The respondent on approaching the Guwahati High  Court against this order, the hon'ble court squashed the criminal  proceedings  pending   before  the  learned Magistrate. After hearing both sides, the Hon'ble Supreme Court decided on 30th...

When debt is bona fide disputed and the defence is a substantial one, the court will not wind up the company

In SHITAL FIBERS LTD.  vs  INDIAN ACRYLICS LIMITED, as per the respondent, appellant had made a payment of Rs.61,83,218/­. However, there was an outstanding balance of Rs.8,92,723/­ as on 28.7.2008. Since despite repeated requests, balance amount was not paid, the respondent issued a statutory notice to the appellant. The same was duly responded to. As the payment was not made despite notice being duly served on the appellant, the respondent filed the aforesaid Company Petition seeking winding up of the present appellant for its inability to pay admitted debts. The learned Company Judge vide order dated 28.9.2015 admitted the Company Petition. However, while doing so, the learned Company Judge observed, that since the appellant was an on­going concern, an opportunity should be granted to it to settle the accounts with the respondent by 31.12.2015. Only in case of failure of the settlement, the citation was directed to be published. On appeal, the Division Bench of the High Cou...

Abusing in-laws a ground for divorce: SC

Abusing in-laws and not allowing them to reside in the matrimonial home by a woman amounts to cruelty to her spouse, ground enough for grant of divorce, the Supreme Court has ruled while allowing an NRI's plea for legal separation from his wife. A bench of Justices Vikaramajit Sen and A M Sapre said such incidents could not be termed as "wear and tear" of family life as held by Madras High Court which had said that a couple must be prepared to face such situations in matrimonial relationship. The NRI had filed a divorce petition alleging that his wife was abusive to his family members and did not allow his parents and siblings to stay in his house when they visited the US. Referring to an incident, the husband told the court that his wife had once locked him and his sister out of the house and abused them saying they belonged to a 'prostitute family'. She refused to allow her sister-in-law to enter the house and even lodged a police complaint against her hu...