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Determination of exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court or any Tribunal

Dhulabhai etc. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and another, AIR 1969 SC 78

1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil courts’ jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.

(3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals.

(4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit.

(5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected, a suit lies.

(6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry.

(7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.

In State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, (1985) 4 SCC 10, the Hon'ble Apex Court, dilating upon the principles stated in Dhulabhai (supra), elucidated the position as under :-

13. Secondly, the principle indicated in the second proposition enunciated in Dhulabhai case requires that the statute, when it creates a special right or liability and provides for its determination, should also lay down that all questions about the said right or liability shall be determined by the Tribunal or authority constituted by it, suggesting thereby that if there is no such provision it will be difficult to infer ouster of the Civil Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate all other questions pertaining to such right or liability.

14. Thirdly, having regard to the principle stated by this Court while enunciating the first proposition in Dhulabhai case it is clear that even where the statute has given finality to the orders of the special tribunal the Civil Court's jurisdiction can be regarded as having been excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit. In other words, even where finality is accorded to the orders passed by the special tribunal one will have to see whether such special tribunal has powers to grant reliefs which Civil Court would normally grant in a suit and if the answer is in the negative it would be difficult to imply or infer exclusion of Civil Court's jurisdiction.”

In State of A.P. Vs. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (Dead) by Lrs. and others, (2000) 3 SCC 689 while considering the scope and ambit of Section 9 of C.P.C. the Hon'ble Apex Court stated as under :-

“5. The normal rule of law is that civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those of which cognisance by them is either expressly or impliedly excluded as provided under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure but such exclusion is not readily inferred and the presumption to be drawn must be in favour of the existence rather than exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil courts to try a civil suit. The test adopted in examining such a question is (i) whether the legislative intent to exclude arises explicitly or by necessary implication, and (ii) whether the statute in question provides for adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party aggrieved by an order made under it.”

In Ramesh Gobindram (Dead) through Lrs. Vs. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf, (2010) 8 SCC 726 while considering the relative jurisdictions under Section 9 of C.P. C. and Section 83 of the Wakf Act, establishing Tribunals it was held as under :

The crucial question that shall have to be answered in every case where a plea regarding exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is raised is whether the Tribunal is under the Act or the Rules required to deal with the matter sought to be brought before a civil court. If it is not, the jurisdiction of the civil court is not excluded. But if the Tribunal is required to decide the matter the jurisdiction of the civil court would stand excluded.”

In Bhosale and another Vs. Shrimant Chhatrapati Vijaysinhraje Shahumaharaj Bhosale and others, 2015 (5) Mh. L.J. 350, 

the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted, unless the entire suit, as brought, is barred. The mere fact that a portion of the claim is excluded from the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not a bar to the trial, particularly of the remaining portion of the same suit which is not so excluded.

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