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Limitation Act - The term "Sufficient Cause" for delay elaborated

In M/S. HIRA SWEETS & CONFECTIONARY PVT. LTD. vs HIRA CONFECTIONERS, the applicant filed an application for condonation of delay of 582 days by claiming unawareness of the ex-parte decree and various  others reasons before the Delhi High Court.

The High Court while rejecting the application held that - 

Insofar as the scope of an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC is concerned, the Court has to see whether the summons in the suit were duly served or not and/or whether the defendant was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from appearing when the suit was called for hearing. In the present case, the defendant was duly served with the summons in the suit and had appeared.

“Sufficient Cause” is an elastic expression and no hard and fast guidelines are prescribed. The Court, in its discretion, has to consider the “sufficient cause” in the facts and circumstances of every individual case. Although in interpreting the words “sufficient cause”, the Court has wide discretion but the same has to be exercised in the particular facts of the case. 

In  Sareen v. National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. And Anr. reported as 2013 SCC OnLine Del 4412,  the expression “sufficient cause” was interpreted as under:

“13. “Sufficient cause” is an expression which has been used in a large number of statutes. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case and duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party had not acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or the party cannot be alleged to have been “not acting diligently” or “remaining inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. (Vide Ramial v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 361], Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi [AIR 1968 SC 222], Surinder Singh Sibia v. Vijay Kumar Sood [(1992) 1 SCC 70] and Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corpn. [(2010) 5 SCC 459].)

xxx xxx xxx

15. While deciding whether there is sufficient cause or not, the court must bear in mind the object of doing substantial justice to all the parties concerned and that the technicalities of the law should not prevent the court from doing substantial justice anddoing away the illegality perpetuated on the basis of the judgment impugned before it. (Vide State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh [(2000) 9 SCC 94], Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535], Davinder Pal Sehgal v. Partap Steel Rolling Mills (P) Ltd. [(2002) 3 SCC 156], Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195], Kaushalya Devi v. Prem Chand [(2005) 10 SCC 127], Srei International Finance Ltd.v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. [(2005) 13 SCC 95] and Reena Sadh v. Aniana Enterprises [(2008) 12 SCC 589].)

 16. In order to determine the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, the test that has to be applied is whether the defendant honestly and sincerely intended to remain present when the suit was called on for hearing and did his best to do so. Sufficient cause is thus the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. Therefore, the applicant must approach the court with a reasonable defence. Sufficient cause is a question of fact and the court has to exercise its discretion in the varied and special circumstances in the case at hand. There cannot be a straitjacket formula of universal application.”

The Supreme Court in A. Murugesan v. Jamuna Rani reported as (2019) 20 SCC 803 affirmed its earlier view in G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada and Others reported as (2000) 3 SCC 54, which is reproduced as under:

“7. Under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC an ex-parte decree passed against a defendant can be set aside upon satisfaction of the Court that either the summons were not duly served upon the defendant or he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. Unless “sufficient cause” is shown for non-appearance of the defendant in the case on the date of hearing, the court has no power to set aside an ex-parte decree. The words “was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing” must be liberally construed to enable the court to do complete justice between the parties particularly when no negligence or inaction is imputable to the has to be construed as an elastic expression for which no hardand-fast guidelines can be prescribed. The courts have a wide discretion in deciding the sufficient cause keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. The “sufficient cause” for non-appearance refers to the date on which the absence was made a ground for proceeding ex-parte and cannot be stretched to rely upon other circumstances anterior in time. If “sufficient cause” is made out for non-appearance of the defendant on the date fixed for hearing when ex pate proceedings were initiated against him, he cannot be penalised for his previous negligence which had been overlooked and thereby condoned earlier. In a case where the defendant approaches the court immediately and within the statutory time specified, the discretion is normally exercised in his favour, provided the absence was not mala fide or intentional. For the absence of a party in the case the other side can be compensated by adequate costs and the lis decided on merits.”


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