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Proper procedure for executing a search warrant in a jurisdiction outside of issuing court

In Angel Click v. State of Karnataka, the petitioners were rice traders in Nagpur (Maharashtra). Their godowns in Nagpur were raided by the Karnataka Police under the authority a search and seizure warrant issued by the Judicial Magistrate, Gangavathi (Karnataka). A considerable number of rice bags of a particular brand were seized and taken away by the Karnataka Police from their godowns. Aggrieved, the petitioners approached the Bombay High Court.

Territorial jurisdiction of High Courts

Respondent Nos.1 and 5 contend in support of their preliminary objection that the entire cause of action comprising the registration of the offences, investigation into the offences and the issuance of search warrant having arisen in the State of Karnataka, this Court cannot entertain this petition.

The Court held that even as regards registration of crime in the present case, we are of the opinion that part of the cause of action has also arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court for the reason that the alleged fraudulent transactions consisted of different parts and some of those parts had their happenings in Nagpur.

The law regarding the power and authority of a High Court to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, Authority or any person is clear. It suggests that such power of a High Court includes the power to issue directions, orders or writs to a Government or Authority or a person situated outside its territorial jurisdiction, if the cause of action for filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arises, wholly or in part, within its territorial jurisdiction. 

Procedural requirements while executing a search warrant in different territory    

Petitioners submitted that the Karnataka Police did not follow the mandatory procedure prescribed in Section 101 and Section 105  of CrPC and, therefore, the seizure of rice bags had been vitiated.

The question raised before the Court was: Whether procedure regarding search and seizure prescribed in Sections 105 and 101 CrPC is mandatory in nature?

The Court concluded that whenever a search warrant is to be executed at a place situated beyond the local limits of jurisdiction of a Court, the Court would have three options available before it and by electing one of the options, it may cause the search warrant executed at a place beyond its territorial jurisdiction:

(i) The first option is of sending the warrant in duplicate to the Presiding Officer of the other Court within whose jurisdiction the place where search warrant is to be executed is situated and the procedure as regards this option is laid down in Section 105.

(ii) The second option is, as per the provisions contained in Section 78, empowering the Court to forward the search warrant by post or otherwise to Executive Magistrate or Superintendent of Police or Commissioner of Police, who shall cause the warrant to be executed, in the manner provided therein.

(ii) The third option is of directing the police officer to execute the search warrant, by following the procedure prescribed in Section 79.

The Court stated that procedure prescribed under Section 105 is not the only one which can be resorted to in such matters and that other options are also available. Therefore, the Court held that the words “may send such summons or warrant in duplicate by post or otherwise, to the Presiding Officer of that Court” used in Section 105(1)(i) cannot be understood as having any prescriptive or mandatory form.

Section 101 procedure governing the disposal of things found in search beyond jurisdiction is mandatory when the modes of execution of warrant laid down in Sections 78 and 79 are resorted to and without any exception. Further, when the mode of execution of warrant referred to in Section 105 is taken recourse to, ordinarily the procedure prescribed by Section 101 for production of seized articles must be followed and it is only in exceptional cases when warranted by fact situation of a particular case that departure therefrom, for reasons to be recorded in writing, can be permitted to be made by the Court getting the warrant executed and that too upon prescription of suitable conditions and adequate safeguards to ensure misuse of powers by the executing officer.


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