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Service cannot be terminated by merely giving notice

In Webfil Ltd. vs Dipesh Kumar Bagchi, writ application was filed by the employer (Webfil Limited) challenging an award  passed by the 8th Industrial Tribunal, state of West Bengal wherein the tribunal passed the award in favour of the employee for payment of all the back wages including the benefit of revised wages or salary etc. The tribunal also held that the termination of the employee by the employer with effect from 31.03.2010 is not justified and the employee is entitled to get reliefs as prayed for.

On appeal before the Calcutta High Court, the Hon'ble Court took strong exception to the fact that while terminating the petitioner only a clause in his appointment letter was used to terminate his service and there was no domestic enquiry against the employee. 

Referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Harjinder Singh vs Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, the court held that such clause of termination of service by giving one month‟s notice is not an acceptable situation at all in view of the change of the entire atmosphere of employer-employee relationship in last 60/70 years and such high-handed action of termination which fits in a feudal minded society for termination of service of a person by merely giving a notice without holding him guilty of any offence is wholly unfit in the atmosphere of a democratic country like ours where the dynamics of law is towards fairness in all actions.

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