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High Court can decline arbitration if the dispute in question does not correlate to the arbitration agreement

In Dlf Home Developers Limited v. Rajapura Homes Private Limited & Anr, on the issue of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 11 or Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, the Supreme Court observed that -

"There is no gainsaying that by virtue of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, by which Section 11 (6-A) was introduced, the earlier position of law as to the scope of interference by this Court at the stage of referral has been substantially restricted. It is also no more res integra that despite the subsequent omission of Section 11(6-A) by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019, the legislative intent behind thereto continues to be a guiding force for the Courts while examining an application under Section 11 of the Act. 18. 

The jurisdiction of this Court under Section 11 is primarily to find out whether there exists a written agreement between the parties for resolution of disputes through arbitration and whether the aggrieved party has made out a prima facie arbitrable case. The limited jurisdiction, however, does not denude this Court of its judicial function to look beyond the bare existence of an arbitration clause to cut the deadwood. A three-judge bench in Vidya Drolia (Supra), has eloquently clarified that this Court, with a view to prevent wastage of public and private resources, may conduct prima facie review at the stage of reference to weed out any frivolous or vexatious claims. In this context, the Court, speaking through Sanjiv Khanna, J. held that: 

154.2. Scope of judicial review and jurisdiction of the court under Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration Act is identical but extremely limited and restricted. 

154.3. The general rule and principle, in view of the legislative mandate clear from Act 3 of 2016 and Act 33 of 2019, and the principle of severability and competence-competence, is that the Arbitral Tribunal is the preferred first authority to determine and decide all questions of non-arbitrability. The court has been conferred power of second look on aspects of non-arbitrability post the award in terms of sub-clauses (i), (ii) or (iv) of Section 34(2)(a) or sub-clause (i) of Section 34(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act. 154.4. Rarely as a demurrer the court may interfere at Section 8 or 11 stage when it is manifestly and ex facie certain that the arbitration agreement is non-existent, invalid or the disputes are non-arbitrable, though the nature and facet of non-arbitrability would, to some extent, determine the level and nature of judicial scrutiny. The restricted and limited review is to check and protect parties from being forced to arbitrate when the matter is demonstrably non-arbitrable and to cut off the deadwood. The court by default would refer the matter when contentions relating to non-arbitrability are plainly arguable; when consideration in summary proceedings would be insufficient and inconclusive; when facts are contested; when the party opposing arbitration adopts delaying tactics or impairs conduct of arbitration proceedings. This is not the stage for the court to enter into a mini trial or elaborate review so as to usurp the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal but to affirm and uphold integrity and efficacy of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. 

N.V. Ramana, J. (as His Lordship then was) in his supplementary opinion further crystalised the position as follows: 

244. Before we part, the conclusions reached, with respect to Question 1, are: 

244.1. Sections 8 and 11 of the Act have the same ambit with respect to judicial interference. 

244.2. Usually, subject-matter arbitrability cannot be decided at the stage of Section 8 or 11 of the Act, unless it is a clear case of deadwood. 

244.3. The court, under Sections 8 and 11, has to refer a matter to arbitration or to appoint an arbitrator, as the case may be, unless a party has established a prima facie (summary findings) case of non- existence of valid arbitration agreement, by summarily portraying a strong case that he is entitled to such a finding. 

244.4. The court should refer a matter if the validity of the arbitration agreement cannot be determined on a prima facie basis, as laid down above i.e. when in doubt, do refer. 

244.5. The scope of the court to examine the prima facie validity of an arbitration agreement includes only: 

244.5.1. Whether the arbitration agreement was in writing? Or 

244.5.3. Whether the core contractual ingredients qua the arbitration agreement were fulfilled? 

244.5.4. On rare occasions, whether the subject-matter of dispute is arbitrable? [Emphasis Applied] 

To say it differently, this Court or a High Court, as the case may be, are not expected to act mechanically merely to deliver a purported dispute raised by an applicant at the doors of the chosen Arbitrator. On the contrary, the Court(s) are obliged to apply their mind to the core preliminary issues, albeit, within the framework of Section 11(6-A) of the Act. Such a review, as already clarified by this Court, is not intended to usurp the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal but is aimed at streamlining the process of arbitration. Therefore, even when an arbitration agreement exists, it would not prevent the Court to decline a prayer for reference if the dispute in question does not correlate to the said agreement. ."

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