Skip to main content

Letters Patent appeal would lie only from the judgment passed in exercise of original jurisdiction

In Union Territory Of Jk vs Shahnaza Parveen & Ors, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent has been filed by B. K. Singh, IFS, Administrative Secretary to Government, Department of School Education, J&K, challenging the orders dated 19th October 2020, 20th November 2020 and 11th  December 2020 passed by the learned Single Judge dealing with the contempt petition CPSW No. 380/2018 arising out of judgment and order dated 12th February 2015 passed by the writ court.."

Dismissing the appeal, the HC held that in State of J&K & Ors vs. Mohd. Tayoub Leharwal and Anr. 2018 (1) JKJ 627 (HC) a Division Bench of this court held that under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1997 Right to Appeal is available only against an order or decision of the High Court to punish for contempt. It has further relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Midnapore People’s Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs. Chuni Lal Nanda 2006 (5) SCC 399 to hold that under Clause 12 of Letters Patent, an appeal would lie to the Division Bench only from the “judgment” of the learned Single Judge passed in exercise of original jurisdiction. The word “judgment” in terms of Clause 12 is undoubtedly a concept of finality in broader sense. It would either be a final judgment, a preliminary judgment or intermediary judgment or interlocutory judgment, but it should be a judgment in the sense that it decides some issue or right between the parties finally. The intermediary and interlocutory orders passed during the course of the proceedings which do not determine any right or issue between the parties cannot be said to be a “judgment” amenable to available jurisdiction of the Division Bench under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.


Comments

Post a Comment

Most viewed this month

One Sided Clauses In Builder-Buyer Agreements Is An Unfair Trade Practice

In CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12238 OF 2018, Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. vs Govindan Raghavan, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court  by the builder against the order of the National Consumer Forum. The builder had relied upon various clauses of the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement to refute the claim of the respondent but was rejected by the commission which found the said clauses as wholly one-sided, unfair and unreasonable, and could not be relied upon. The Supreme Court on perusal of the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement found stark incongruities between the remedies available to both the parties. For example, Clause 6.4 (ii) of the Agreement entitles the Appellant – Builder to charge Interest @18% p.a. on account of any delay in payment of installments from the Respondent – Flat Purchaser. Clause 6.4 (iii) of the Agreement entitles the Appellant – Builder to cancel the allotment and terminate the Agreement, if any installment remains in arrears for more than 30 da...
Post a Comment
Read more

Inherited property of childless hindu woman devolve onto heirs of her parents

In Tarabai Dagdu Nitanware vs Narayan Keru Nitanware, quashing an order passed by a joint civil judge junior division, Pune, the Bombay High Court has held that under Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother, will devolve upon the heirs of her father/mother, if she dies without any children of her own, and not upon her husband. Justice Shalini Phansalkar Joshi was hearing a writ petition filed by relatives of one Sundarabai, who died issueless more than 45 years ago on June 18, 1962. Article referred:http://www.livelaw.in/property-inherited-female-hindu-parents-shall-devolve-upon-heirs-father-not-husband-dies-childless-bombay-hc-read-judgment/
Post a Comment
Read more

Court approached in the early stages of arbitration will prevail in all other subsequent proceedings

In National Highway Authority of India v. Hindustan Steelworks Construction Limited, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court opined that once the parties have approached a certain court for relief under Act at earlier stages of disputes then it is same court that, parties must return to for all other subsequent proceedings. Language of Section 42 of Act is categorical and brooks no exception. In fact, the language used has the effect of jurisdiction of all courts since it states that once an application has been made in Part I of the Act then ―that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court. Court holds that NHAI in present case cannot take advantage of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for explaining inordinate delay in filing present petition under Section 34 of this Act in this Court.
Post a Comment
Read more