In National Spot Exchange Limited v. Mr. Anil Kohli, Resolution Professional for Dunar Foods Limited, appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against the order of the NCLAT refusing to condone the delay of 44 days in preferring the appeal against the order passed by the NCLT, rejecting the claim of the appellant herein.
The appellant submitted that though the learned Appellate Tribunal may be justified in dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation by holding that the Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond 15 days, it is prayed to exercise the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Heavy reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in the cases of Chitra Sharma v. Union of India, reported in (2018) 18 SCC 575 ; Jaiprakash Associates Limited v. IDBI Bank Limited, reported in (2020) 3 SCC 328 ; and Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mampee Timbers and Hardwares Pvt. Ltd., reported in (2021) 3 SCC 673, in support of his prayer to condone the delay beyond the time prescribed under the IBC, i.e., the delay of 44 days in preferring the appeal before the NCLAT, in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
The Sc however observed that it is true that in a given case there may arise a situation where the applicant/appellant may not be in a position to file the appeal even within a statutory period of limitation prescribed under the Act and even within the extended maximum period of appeal which could be condoned owing to genuineness, viz., illness, accident etc. However, under the statute, the Parliament has not carved out any exception of such a situation. Therefore, in a given case, it may cause hardship, however, unless the Parliament has carved out any exception by a provision of law, the period of limitation has to be given effect to. Such powers are only with the Parliament and the legislature. The courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to carve out any exception. If the courts carve out an exception, it would amount to legislate which would in turn might be inserting the provision to the statute, which is not permissible.
In the case of Rohitash Kumar (supra), this court observed and held as under:-
23. There may be a statutory provision, which causes great hardship or inconvenience to either the party concerned, or to an individual, but the Court has no choice but to enforce it in full rigor. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that hardship or inconvenience caused, cannot be used as a basis to alter the meaning of the language employed by the legislature, if such meaning is clear upon a bare perusal of the Statute. If the language is plain and hence allows only one meaning, the same has to be given effect to, even if it causes hardship or possible injustice. (Vide: Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax, West Bengal v. Keshab Chandra Mandal, AIR 1950 SC 265 ; and D. D. Joshi & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1983) 2 SCC 235 ).
24. In Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 1955 SC 661 it was observed by a Constitution Bench of this Court that, if there is any hardship, it is for the legislature to amend the law, and that the Court cannot be called upon, to discard the cardinal rule of interpretation for the purpose of mitigating such hardship. If the language of an Act is sufficiently clear, the Court has to give effect to it, however, inequitable or unjust the result may be. The words, dura lex sed lex which mean the law is hard but it is the law. may be used to sum up the situation. Therefore, even if a statutory provision causes hardship to some people, it is not for the Court to amend the law. A legal enactment must be interpreted in its plain and literal sense, as that is the first principle of interpretation.
A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. A statute must of course be given effect to whether a Court likes the result or not. (See also: The Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal I, Calcutta v. M/s Vegetables Products Ltd., (1973) 1 SCC 442 ; and Tata Power Company Ltd. v. Reliance Energy Limited & Ors., (2009) 16 SCC 659 ).
Therefore, it is evident that the hardship caused to an individual, cannot be a ground for not giving effective and grammatical meaning to every word of the provision, if the language used therein, is unequivocal.
In the case of Mishri Lal & Others (supra), it is observed that the law prevails over equity if there is a conflict. It is observed further that equity can only supplement the law and not supplant it.
Comments
Post a Comment