Skip to main content

Exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy

In Phoenix Arc Private Limited v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir & Ors, while elaborating on the issue of the power of High Courts under Article 226 when alternate remedy is available, the Supreme Court referred to Mathew Varghese Vs. M. Amritha Kumar and Ors., (2014) 5 SCC 610, wherein the Court had held that the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is not absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution ought not to be entertained if alternate statutory remedies are available, except in cases falling within the well-defined exceptions as observed in CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal [CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603 ].

Exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy are where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice.

The Court has however held that though the above exceptions remain valid, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case [Thansingh Nathmal v. Supt. of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419 ] , Titaghur Paper Mills case [Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 ] and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.

Comments

Most viewed this month

Registrar cannot remove trademark from record without notice to trademark holder

In Kleenage Products (India) Private Limited vs The Registrar of Trade Marks, the petitioner had applied for registration of trademark ‘KLITOLIN’ which was accepted and from 1988 to 2009, the said trademark was renewed multiple times. The trademark was due for renewal on August 21, 2009, but the petitioner failed to tender application for renewal.  It was, thereafter, revealed that the trademark is likely to be removed from the register. The petitioner contended that the Registrar of Trademarks (respondent No.1) also failed to issue the requisite mandatory notice in Form O-3 to him (the registered proprietor) under Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Bombay High Court allowed the petition holding that any such removal can only be possible if prior notice, mandatory under Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1999, has been given Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/removal-registered-trademarks-cant-done-without-giving-prior-notice-registered-proprie...

Dishonour of cheques - Jurisdiction and cause of action explained

In a landmark judgment, Hon'ble Supreme Court went to some length to define the cause of action and jurisdiction of cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. While deciding in 2014 STPL(Web) 499 SC 1, Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., the Hon'ble court said, one of the main issues faced by the court (a) from which stage do we consider a offence under Section 138 to have been caused (b) Where would the jurisdiction of the court lie if the cheque was drawn in city A and presented dishonored in City B ? After discussion on various past decisions, the Hon'ble court finally affirmed, " To sum up: (i) An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is committed no sooner a cheque drawn by the accused on an account being maintained by him in a bank for discharge of debt/liability is returned unpaid for insufficiency of funds or for the reason that the amount exceeds the arrangement made with the bank. (...

Loss of earning capacity, and not percentage of disability, must decide compensation, says HC

While computing compensation claims of accident victims, the victim's loss of earning capacity shall outweigh the percentage/extent of his disability, the Madras high court has felt. Justice R Mahadevan, enhancing the compensation payable to an injured driver by Rs 2 lakh, said: "In cases for compensation, it is not the disability, which is partial or total, alone that matters, it is the loss in earning capacity as a result of accident that is to be considered." R Murali, driver of a mixed concrete vehicle, met with an accident in January 2009 and suffered injuries in hip, right leg and ankle. He claimed loss of 100% earning capacity and sought appropriate compensation along with 12% interest rate. However, as the disability certificate issued by a doctor pegged the percentage of his disability at 60%, the deputy commissioner of labour-II, awarded Rs 3.12 lakh as compensation, by fixing the monthly income at Rs 4,000. Aggrieved by the poor package, Murali filed the...